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Abstract

Entity authentication is becoming more and more important. With widespread
use of distributed computer networks, for example, cellular networks, virtual reality communities, World Wide Web, peer-to-peer networks and multiplayer online
games, there is a need to be more vigilant about the security and privacy of users.
One way to address the security and privacy concerns is remote user authentication
and this is widely used in distributed systems for identifying users and servers. Remote user authentication is a means of identifying a user and verifying whether this
user has permission to access the network services and resources. However, an attacker may impersonate a server to communicate with a user and then, the attacker
is able to steal the user’s information. Thereafter, the attacker can pass authentication with the real server by using the stolen information of the user. Therefore,
mutual authentication is needed in order to prevent bogus server attacks. Other
requirements of user authentication include ensuring the confidentiality of further
exchanging messages, protecting user privacy, providing user anonymity and achieving unlinkability. In the complex environments of computer networks, however, it
is a challenge to design efficient and secure mutual authentication protocols under
such security requirements.
The research reported here aims to provide efficient and secure identification
services with further security requirements for users in distributed systems and networks. In general, the identification services may require three factors, i.e., password, smart card and biometric characteristics. The authentication which based
on password is called password-based authentication. Password-based authentication together with another factor, smart card, is called two-factor authentication. In
which, a successful user authentication can be achieved if the user has a correct password together with a corresponding smart card. The biometric-based authentication
mainly based on the biometric characteristics, for example, finger print, iris scan and
a face, and it may also require a smart card. The three-factor authentication consists
v

all of these three factors, i.e., password, smart card and biometric characteristics.
There is another concept which belongs to two-factor authentication, called single
sign-on (SSO). It enables a user to use a unitary secure credential (or token) to
access multiple computers and systems where he/she has access permissions.
The contributions of this thesis are research on both single sign-on and threefactor authentication. In particular, this research will analyse the recent, supposed
secure single sign-on scheme proposed in 2012 by Chang and Lee [CL12]. However, their scheme is actually not secure as we show that it fails to meet credential
privacy and soundness of authentication. Based on this analysis, this research will
suggest repairs to the scheme by employing the efficient verifiable encryption of
RSA signature (RSA-VES) proposed by Ateniese [Ate99] for realising fair exchange
of RSA signatures. In addition, this research will formalize the security model of
single sign-on schemes with authenticated key exchange, and based on the model, a
provably secure single sign-on scheme will be proposed. This scheme satisfies soundness, preserves credential privacy, meets user anonymity and supports session key
exchange. For users who have higher security requirements, this research also proposes an improved generic framework, which is an efficiently systematic approach
which upgrades two-factor authentication schemes to three-factor authentication
schemes. This research also provides a provably secure concrete instantiation of the
framework with comparison, practicability analysis, privacy discussion and formal
security proof.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

1.1

Overview of Cryptography

Classic cryptography is the techniques of hiding the meaning of a written text.
It was first documented in the use of non-standard hieroglyphs by ancient Egyptians circa 1900 B.C., for secure communication in the presence of third parties,
i.e. ‘adversaries’. Since World War I it has been growing and effectively became
synonymous with ‘encryption’ until the advent of modern cryptography.
Modern cryptography intersects with a number of different disciplines, like mathematics, computer science and electrical engineering. The algorithms designed for
modern cryptography normally rely on computational hardness assumptions, for
example, the difficulty of integer factorization in number theory. Theoretically, it
is, indeed, possible to break these algorithms (e.g. by brute force attack) but it
is unfeasible using known techniques and computational devices. So, the security
of cryptographic algorithms and their applications are called computationally secure. Today, in terms of information security, the field of cryptography has been
expanded from confidentiality and integrity to various aspects such as authentication, non-repudiation, trust and privacy.
Public key cryptography, also known as asymmetric cryptography, was invented
in the late 1970s. It enables building secret communication using a public channel
without the establishment of a prior secret key. In 1976, Diffie and Hellman [DH76]
were first proposed a solution to address the problem of key distribution using publickey cryptography. Their idea involved using two distinct keys, one for plaintext
encryption that can be made public, and one for ciphertext decryption which is
kept private. Key generation requires that deducing the secret key from the public
key is computationally unfeasible. Public key cryptosystems make authentication
easy to achieve and have inspired a lot of research. As a result, a number of schemes
1
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for user authentication and message authentication have been devised.

1.2

User Authentication

User authentication is the process of individual identity confirmation, to ensure
that an individual is really who he claims to be. Probably the earliest user authentication mechanism was based on passwords. This concept was first proposed
by Lamport in 1981 [Lam81], and remains the most common mechanism for user
authentication in computer systems and networks.
While such protocols have been widely used, a number of problems have appeared, for example, the poor selection of passwords, the shortcoming of capture by
Trojans and the reuse of passwords. These can lead to attacks such as dictionary
attacks. Dictionary attack is the method to break the password-based authentication scheme by systematically trying every likely word or the likely combination of
words in a dictionary as a password. This attack works because that many users
prefer to use some ordinary words as passwords. For example, the user’s first name
or his/her telephone number. A good remedy is the use of hardware authentication
tokens together with passwords to enhance security. This is called two factor authentication, which has become popular, consisting of a password together with a
hardware token which is usually a smart card.
Since Chang and Wu [CW91] introduced the remote user authentication scheme
using smart cards in 1991, there are many two-factor authentication schemes which
have been proposed. The security, however, could remain compromised since the
smart card may be stolen, the range of possible password could be small and users
may frequently forget or lose their passwords. Due to such concerns, biometric
identification, which exploits the biometric features of the user to authenticate
him/herself, has been introduced.
Biometric identification overcomes the flaws of two-factor authentication because
biometric features have high entropy, cannot be forgotten and are rarely lost [JR03].
The first biometric authentication scheme was ‘fuzzy commitment’, proposed by
Juels and Wattenberg [JW99] in 1999. This has inspired many subsequent researchers. One problem is that biometric features are not completely private since
they may easily be ‘stolen’; e.g. the fingerprint can be obtained from things the person has touched and the facial features may be obtained from a user’s photograph.
A way to alleviate these problems is to combine all three of these factors in what is
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called ‘three-factor authentication’.
Different techniques are selected depending upon the requirements of different
services. For example, the security of Email is normally based on password only;
the security of ATM services may require both a smart card and a personal identification number (PIN, as a password); and the higher level access control of financial
organisations and the military usually require multiple factors.

1.3
1.3.1

Related Work
Password-Based Authentication

To thwart the compromise of password table, which is maintained by a server,
many schemes [EKW74, LMM81] have been proposed using password hashing rather
than the plain password in a directory table. This method protects passwords even
when the directory table is disclosed. However, an adversary may impersonate
a legal user to pass authentication by modifying the data in the directory table.
Other schemes, such as [SKS+ 92, NSC+ 93, OR87, SY96, Syv93], attempt to ensure
the authentication with the help of a trusted third party in networks, in which,
the secret information (e.g. secret key) must be stored in a table on the server side.
Thus, security is not reliable since leaking of the table could lead to system breakage.

1.3.2

Two-Factor Authentication

To eliminate the shortcomings of using directory tables, two-factor schemes which
are based on both a password and a smart card have been proposed [CW91, CH93,
OT89]. However, they all have drawbacks [YS99]. To resolve the problems in these
schemes, Yang and Shieh [YS99] proposed two two-factor authentication schemes,
one based on timestamp and the other based on random nonce. Both support easy
password changing. Later, Chan and Cheng [CC02], and Fan et al. [FLZ02] found
that the Yang-Schieh scheme is insecure against impersonation attack. To remedy
this flaw, Shen, Lin and Hwang [SLH03], and Yang, Wang and Chang [YWC05]
suggested improvements to the Yang-Schieh scheme. However, Yoon et al. [YKY05]
identified attacks on the YWC-scheme [YWC05], and then improved the scheme.
In 2006, however, Wang and Bao [WB06] pointed out that both the SLH-scheme
[SLH03] and Yoon et al.’s scheme [YKY05] are vulnerable to impersonation attacks.
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Single Sign-On
With the increasing usage of network services, a user may need to maintain more
and more ID/password pairs for accessing different distributed service providers.
This imposes a burden on users and service providers as well as the communication
overhead of computer networks. To tackle this problem, a single sign-on (SSO)
mechanism [Gro] has been introduced so that after obtaining a credential from a
trusted authority, each legal user can use this single credential to authenticate itself
and then access multiple service providers.
Intuitively, an SSO scheme should meet at least three basic security requirements:
completeness, soundness and credential privacy. Completeness of authentication
[BR93a] requires that: (a) both sides accept each other if they have matched the
conversation; (b) the probability that one side accepts the other one who actually
has not engaged in the matching conversation is negligible. Soundness means that
an unregistered user without a credential should not be able to access the services
offered by service providers. Credential privacy guarantees that colluding dishonest
service providers should not be able to fully recover a user’s credential and then
impersonate the user to log in to other service providers.
Formal security definitions of SSO schemes were given in [HMSY10]. However,
soundness of credential based authentication has not been formally studied yet despite its importance, and the preserving of both soundness and credential privacy is
still a challenge in designing an SSO [WYX12].
In 2000, Lee and Chang [LC00] first proposed a user identification and key distribution scheme, actually an SSO scheme, maintaining user anonymity in distributed
computer networks. Later, Wu and Hsu [WH04] pointed out that the Lee-Chang
scheme is vulnerable to masquerading attacks and identity disclosure attacks. The
former enable an adversary to impersonate a service provider to exchange the session
key with users and then to obtain sensitive information in further communication.
This is possible because of the one-way authentication in the Lee-Chang scheme.
The second type of attack, which focuses on the user anonymity, can expose the
identity of a user. Meanwhile, Yang et al. [YWB+ 04] showed that the Wu-Hsu
scheme cannot preserve credential privacy either, since a malicious service provider
can recover users’ credentials, and they then proposed an improvement to overcome
this limitation. In 2006, however, Mangipudi and Katti [MK06] pointed out that
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Yang et al.’s scheme is insecure against DoS (Deniable of Service) attack and presented a new scheme. In 2009, Hsu and Chuang [HC09] demonstrated that both the
Yang et al. and the Mangipudi-Katti schemes do not provide user anonymity since
their schemes are vulnerable to identity disclosure attacks. To prevent such attacks,
Hsu and Chuang proposed an RSA-based user identification scheme.
In [HMSY10], Han et al. proposed a generic SSO construction which relies on
broadcast encryption plus zero knowledge (ZK) proof [FFS88] showing that the
prover knows the corresponding private key of a given public key. So, implicitly,
each user is assumed to have been issued a public key in a public key infrastructure
(PKI). In the setting of an RSA cryptosystem, such ZK proof is very inefficient due
to the complexity of interactive communications between the prover (a user) and
the verifier (a service provider).
Recently, Chang and Lee [CL12] pointed out that the Hsu-Chuang scheme is vulnerable to impersonation attacks and the scheme requires additional time-synchronized
mechanisms which have unstable latency in distributed networks. Then, they proposed a user anonymity preserving improvement with high efficiency. The scheme
used random nonce to replace an additional time-synchronized mechanism, does
not need PKI (Public key infrastructure) for users, and is suitable for mobile device
users. Compared with Han et al.’s generic scheme, the Chang-Lee scheme has several
attractive features: less underlying primitives without using broadcast encryption,
high efficiency without resort to ZK proof and no requirement of PKI for users.
Unfortunately, the analysis in Chapter 3 shows that the Chang-Lee scheme fails
to provide proper user authentication and to preserve credential privacy since the
knowledge proof of user authentication guarantees neither soundness nor credential
privacy.

1.3.3

Biometric Authentication

To prevent the inherent drawbacks of passwords, biometric authentication has
been proposed. In 1999, Juels and Wattenberg [JW99] proposed the first fuzzy
commitment scheme, using Hamming distance to tolerate errors. Later, in 2002,
Juels and Sudan [JS02] introduced a provably secure fuzzy vault scheme, in which
a user chooses a long-bit secret key (treated as a biometric key) and hides it using
the user’s biometric template. The fuzzy vault scheme uses Euclidean distance
measurement to tolerate errors. One year after, Clancy et. al [Cla03] proposed
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a secure smart card-based fingerprint authentication scheme, which was based on
Juels and Sudan’s fuzzy vault. In 2007, Nandakumar et. al [NJP07] proposed a
fully automatic implementation by employing a fuzzy vault, using helper data to
align unidentified fingerprints accurately. The improved scheme used both location
and orientation attributes (x, y, θ) of a minutia point to record the biometric data,
where (x, y) is the row and column that indicate the location in the image, and
θ is the orientation in respect to the X-axis. The helper data are high curvature
points extracted from the fingerprint orientation field, thus it neither affects the
security nor leaks any information about the biometric template. Fuzzy vault has
been widely accepted since the Euclidean distance measurement is suitable for the
majority of biometric applications [WQ10].
Another famous scheme by Dodis et al. [DRS04], called ‘fuzzy extractor’, generates a pair including a secret key and a public key directly from the user’s biometric
template and uses Hamming distance, set difference and edit distance to tolerate
errors. Other interesting works are briefly reviewed as follows. In 2008, Teoh and
Ong [AT08] proposed a randomized dynamic quantization transformation (RDQT),
which is based on fuzzy commitment, to binarize biometric data, satisfying randomness and uniqueness. Meanwhile, Sheng et.al [SHFD08] presented a template-free
biometric-key generation, which can also generate a key directly from biodata.

1.3.4

Three-Factor Authentication

To achieve stronger security requirements, three-factor authentication has been
introduced since the biometric features may not be completely private. In 2003,
Kim et al. [KLY03] proposed two ID-based password authentication schemes, using
smart card and fingerprints, without the use of public key directory tables. However,
Scott [Sco04] pointed out that a passive eavesdropper without access to any smart
cards, passwords, or fingerprints, could impersonate any identity to log in to the
server after successfully eavesdropping legitimate log-on only once.
In 2004, Uludag et al. [UPJP04] surveyed various types of biometric cryptosystems, and they recommended using digital rights management (DRM) systems [JM03] to address the problems of biometric cryptosystems. In their methods,
the cryptographic key is bound with biometric template then stored in a database.
Thus, the key cannot be revealed without passing biometric authentication. However, the requirement of the biometric database has increased the cost and put
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users’ privacy at risk. To protect users’ privacy, in 2006 Bhargav-Spantze et al.
[BSSB06, BSSM+ 07] proposed a novel privacy preserving two-phase multi-factor
authentication scheme with biometrics, based on zero knowledge proof (ZKP), in
which, user privacy is preserved by using the Petersen commitments. However, the
scheme is very costly because the modular exponentiations and the database of all
users’ commitments are stored on the server side. In 2009, Fan and Lin [FL09] constructed an efficiency enhancing and privacy preserving three-factor authentication
scheme, but it did not support free password changing and it had flaws in the formal
proof. In their security proof, Theorem 2 defines that the protocol is a secure key
exchange scheme if the public-key encryption scheme used in the protocol is secure
against CCA2; however, in step 3 of the protocol, the session key material v is encrypted in a symmetric key scheme, and the session key h(v) is only decided by the
server, where h(·) is a hash function. Thus, if the symmetric key encryption scheme
is insecure, then the protocol cannot provide secure key exchanging.
Recently, Li and Hwang [LH10] proposed an efficient biometric-based remote
user authentication scheme using smart cards, without synchronized clocks. Later,
Li et al. [LNM+ 11] pointed out that the Li-Huang scheme does not provide proper
authentication since the scheme is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attack. To address this shortcoming, they presented a further improvement. In 2011, however,
Das et al. [Das11] found Li et al.’s improved scheme neither provided strong authentication nor supported easy password change. They then presented an improvement
on Li et al.’s scheme. Our analysis, however, shows this scheme is vulnerable to the
off-line guessing password attack. An adversary who has a smart card, can extract
fi ,ri ,N from the smart card, where fi = h(BioDatai ), ri = h(h(N ||P Wi )||fi ). Then,
the adversary can crack the user’s password by matching ri = h(h(N ||P Wi )||fi ) for
every different P Wi in the password range.
In 2011, Huang et al. [HXC+ 11] proposed a generic framework for three-factor
authentication, preserving security and privacy. The basic idea is to use fuzzy
extractor to generate the biometric key from the biometric templates, and run twice
a underlying two-factor authentication scheme. In the first time it runs the twofactor scheme as normal, and in the second time it uses the biometric key to replace
the password and runs the underlying scheme again, thus achieving a three-factor
scheme. This framework does not require any additional mechanism to enhance
the underlying two-factor authentication protocol, and in the derived scheme, users
need not show their biometric features to the server, and servers need not store any
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user information on a database. Thus, privacy is preserved and cost is reduced.

1.4

Challenges

The need for authentication of individual identity is a fundamental requirement
in our society. In this computer age, single sign-on is a highly desirable solution for
user authentication, suiting most common users since it reduces requirements for
multiple logins and for remembering multiple IDs/passwords. This also alleviates
forgotten password problems. Unfortunately, there are some shortcomings in the
existing schemes such as (a) the inability to preserve user anonymity properly; (b)
vulnerability to possible attacks, e.g. impersonation attacks; (c) a seeming absence
of formal study and proof on soundness of the single sign-on; (d) the requirement
for additional time-synchronized mechanisms; (e) lower efficiency and higher cost.
Thus, it is a challenge to design an efficient and provably secure single sign-on scheme
in distributed networks.
For users who have higher security requirements, three factor authentication is
an ideal solution since it incorporates all advantages of password-based authentication, two-factor authentication and biometric authentication. An ideal three-factor
authentication protocol can greatly ensure information confidentiality in distributed
systems. However, the existing research on three-factor authentication is far from
satisfactory and has a number of problems. The literature shows, for example, that
corrupting biometric data is not only a privacy issue but is also related to the security of protocols; most existing solutions, and even their improved versions, have
flaws which can lead to protocol breaking. Thus, it is a challenge to design a provably secure three-factor authentication scheme which preserves privacy in complex
network environments.

1.5

Aims and Objectives

This thesis provides research into remote user authentication and focuses in
particular on single sign-on and three-factor authentication. The aims of this thesis
are as follows:
1. In the literature, several single sign-on schemes have been proposed. However,
most of them have security flaws, and even worse, their improvements are also
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insecure against possible attacks. Thus, this thesis aims to give an insight into
the most recent SSO schemes identifying their flaws, issues and challenges.
2. The second aim of this thesis is to formalize the single sign-on and its security
model to formally resolve the issues identified. Also, an efficient and provably
secure single sign-on authentication scheme without the identified drawbacks
will be provided according to the formal model.
3. A generic framework for three-factor authentication is the third aim of this
thesis. The framework, which is efficient and practical, can upgrade twofactor authentication schemes to three-factor authentication schemes without
additional requirements on the underlying schemes, and can preserve user
privacy even when interfacing with a malicious server. Also, a concrete threefactor authentication scheme with formal security proof is needed.

1.6

Organisation of The Thesis

This thesis considers the use of single sign-on and three-factor authentication in
the context of distributed environments. This chapter has reviewed the literature
and the importance of user authentication and discussed the challenges and aims of
this research.
Chapter 2 introduces five areas of background information relevant to the current
research. The first part introduces some intractable problems with special focus on
the discrete logarithm problem and the Diffie-Hellman problem. The chapter then
reviews some cryptographic tools, encryption mechanisms and digital signatures.
Finally, zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge is discussed in the last part.
Chapter 3 first reviews the recent Chang-Lee scheme [CL12]. Chang and Lee
claimed high security but this chapter demonstrates that the scheme is actually
insecure as it fails to meet credential privacy and soundness of authentication. In
particular, this chapter presents two impersonation attacks which also apply to another SSO scheme proposed by Hsu and Chuang [HC09], which inspired the design
of the Chang-Lee scheme. This chapter then identifies the flaws in their security arguments to explain why attacks are possible against their SSO scheme. Moreover, by
employing the efficient verifiable encryption of RSA signatures (RSA-VES) as proposed by Ateniese [Ate99], this chapter proposes an improvement for repairing the
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Chang-Lee scheme. In addition, the formal study of the soundness of authentication
has been identified as one open problem.
Chapter 4 formalizes the security model of the single sign-on schemes with authenticated key exchange. In particular, this chapter points out the difference between soundness and credential privacy, and combines them both into one definition.
This part also proposes a provably secure single sign-on authentication scheme which
satisfies soundness, preserves credential privacy, meets user anonymity and supports
session key exchange. The proposed scheme is very efficient so that it is suitable for
mobile devices in distributed systems and networks.
Chapter 5 reviews and improves a generic framework for three-factor authentication proposed by Huang et. al [HXC+ 11] and then proposes a provably secure concrete instantiation according to the improved framework. Before reviewing Huang’s
framework, this part discusses two biometric identification schemes. Then, based
on the discussion, this chapter suggests improvements to Huang’s framework by
employing fuzzy vault as first proposed by Juels and Sudan [JS02]. In addition, a
concrete scheme is given by incorporating fuzzy vault and Yang’s scheme [YWWD08]
via the improved framework. This chapter also provides the practicability analysis
of the derived scheme, then compares the scheme with other existing three-factor
schemes and lastly, it also provides a formal security proof and a privacy discussion
of the concrete instantiation.
Finally, Chapter 6 concludes this thesis with a summary of our proposed contributions, future work and new open problems for future research.

Chapter 2
Background
This chapter introduces five areas of fundamental background knowledge: intractable problems, cryptographic tools, encryption techniques, digital signatures
and zero-knowledge proof of knowledge (ZKPK).

2.1
2.1.1

Intractable Problems
Discrete Logarithm Problem

The discrete logarithm problem [Mao04] is a significant element in a number
of theoretical problems and is the core problem at the root of many difficulties
encountered in cryptographic security assumptions.
Definition 2.1. (Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP)) In a cyclic group with generator
g, the DLP is defined as follows.
On input (g, y) ∈ G, output a such that y = g a .

2.1.2

Diffie-Hellman Problem

The Diffie-Hellman problem (DHP) was proposed by Diffie and Hellman [DH76].
The DHP can be divided into two related problems: computational DHP and decisional DHP.
Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Problem
Definition 2.2. In a cyclic group G of order p with generator g, pick integers
a, b ∈ {0, 1, ..., p − 1} randomly and take g, g a , g b as input, the CDH problem is to
compute g ab without given the values of a and b.
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The CDH problem [DH76] is closely related to the DLP due to the open question
of whether the DLP problem can be solved if CDH has been solved in G.
Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) Problem
The DDH problem has been proposed as a decisional version of the CDH problem.
Definition 2.3. In a cyclic group G of order p with generator g, pick integers
a, b, z ∈ {0, 1, ..., p − 1} randomly and given two distributions (g, g a , g b , g z ) and
(g, g a , g b , g ab ), the DDH problem is to distinguish these two distributions. In other
words, the problem is to decide whether g z = g ab without knowing a, b and z.

2.2
2.2.1

Cryptographic Tools
Cryptographic Hash Functions

A cryptographic hash function [Mao04], H:{0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}k , is an algorithm
which outputs the fixed k-length string for any arbitrary length input and has been
widely employed in cryptographic schemes. In this thesis, all hash functions refer
to the ideal cryptographic hash function which meets three main properties.
• The hash value is easy to compute for any given input message.
• It is unfeasible to find two distinct messages with the same hash value.
• It is unfeasible to recover a message from its hash value.
In 1986, Fiat and Shamir [FS86] first proposed the random oracle model (ROM),
and later, it was formalized by Bellare and Rogaway [BR93b]. In the ROM, a hash
function is modelled as a random oracle which is a theoretical black box. This black
box answers every query with a random number selected from its output domain.
In other words, the output of the hash function is treated as a randomness in the
cryptographic security proof. However, one concern is that no hash function can be
realized as a truly random function in the real world. Thus, some researchers have
tried to prove schemes without the use of a random oracle. Despite this argument,
the ROM is still popularly used in cryptographic security proofs. For example,
Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) [BR94a] and one-mask DiffieHellman key exchange (OMDHKE) [BCP04] are provably secure in the ROM.
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Time Stamp

In this thesis, the ‘time stamp’ means a digital time stamp. It is a proof showing
that a digital event existed at a certain time and the event has not been changed
since that time. In cryptography, it is normally employed to prevent message replay
attacks. Time stamp is usually in two procedures: one is the signing procedure
which binds the local clock code together with message and signs a signature on it;
the other is the verifying procedure which convinces the receiver that the received
message is valid only if the time stamp is being received for the first time.
The drawback of using the time stamp is the requirement of time synchronizing.
This imposes restrictions on the use of time stamp. Thus, there are many schemes
interested in using random nonce to achieve the same goal.

2.2.3

Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange

The Diffie-Hellman key exchange scheme is the first public key system, proposed
by Diffie and Hellman in 1976 [DH76]. The scheme is widely accepted in public key
systems to establish a session key. The session key enables two entities to communicate with each other over a public network with data integrity and confidentiality.
The security of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange scheme is based on the computational Diffie-Hellman problem. The processes are as follows.
• Initialization. Two entities Alice and Bob agree on a cyclic group G with a
generator g.
• Key Exchange. Alice and Bob choose secret random integers a and b respectively, calculate their own session key materials g a and g b respectively, and
then send them to each other.
• Key Agreement. Alice and Bob calculate the session key by (g b )a and (g a )b ,
respectively. Now, they share the same session key g ab for further communication.
To prevent man-in-the-middle attacks, normally the session key material is bound
together with the entity identity using cryptographic techniques, e.g. digital signature scheme.
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Encryption Techniques
Symmetric Key Encryption

Symmetric key encryption is used to encrypt plaintext and decrypt ciphertext
with the same secret key. The secret key is a shared secret between the sender
and receiver such as a simple word, a name, or a random number. For example,
the secret key can be the letters in the first column of the second page in the
Bible. Since symmetric key encryption is more efficient than public key encryption,
it is the favorite for protocol designing, e.g. Transport Layer Security (TLS) and
Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME). However, key sharing is
a vulnerability of symmetric key encryption since that it requires a truly secure
channel to share a key privately.
Symmetric key encryption can be classified into stream ciphers and block ciphers.
The former is exceptionally fast but has a high cost and normally operates one bit
at a time; the latter operates on a block of bits and has been used more frequently.
An example of a stream cipher is the one-time pad [Mil82] introduced by Frank
Miller in 1882. It has been proven that it is impossible to crack if used correct. RC4
is another example of a stream cipher, which was proposed by Ron Rivest of RSA
Security in 1987 [Wik12a] and adopted in Secure Sockets Layer (SSL). The most
well-known block cipher schemes are Data Encryption Standard (DES) which was
published as FIPS PUB 46 in 1977 [oS77], Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
which was designed by Daemen and Rijmen [DR00] and published as U.S. FIPS
PUB 197 in 2001 to supersede DES.

2.3.2

Asymmetric Key Encryption

Public encryption was first publicly introduced in the paper ‘New Directions in
Cryptography’ [DH76] by Diffie and Hellman in 1976. Public key cryptosystems
require two separate keys, one for plaintext encryption and one for ciphertext decryption. The encryption key can be published and the decryption key is kept
secret.
Many classic asymmetric key encryption schemes have been widely adopted,
e.g. RSA encryption [RSA78], ElGmagal encryption [ElG85], optimal asymmetric
encryption padding (OAEP) [BR94b] and OAEP+ [Sho02].
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RSA Encryption Scheme
The RSA cryptosystem is the best known and one of the most widely used
public key cryptosystems. It was invented in 1978 by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman
[RSA78]. There are two algorithms in RSA cryptosystem with two different keys
for encryption and decryption. Anyone can access the encryption algorithm with
a public key offered by the person who receives the messages. Thereafter, anyone
can send encrypted messages (ciphertext) to the receiver. However, it is impossible
to decrypt the ciphertext if only the public key is known. Thus, only the receiver
who knows the private key can decrypt the ciphertext. The RSA encryption scheme
consists of three parts, namely initialization, encryption and decryption.
• Initialization
1. Select two distinct large primes p and q. Here, ‘large’ means from 1024
to 2048 bits or 308 to 616 decimal digits.
2. Calculate n = p · q and φ(n) = (p − 1) · (q − 1).
3. Choose a random integer e < φ(n) such that gcd(e, φ(n)) = 1 and publish
the public key (n, e).
4. Compute the integer d such that e·d ≡ 1 mod φ(n) and store the private
key d.
• Encryption. Given a (block of) message 0 ≤ m < n, the ciphertext c is the
least residue of me mod n. That is c ≡ me mod n.
• Decryption. To decrypt the ciphertext c, the plaintext can be recovered by
calculating the least residue of cd mod n. That is m ≡ cd mod n, where
0 ≤ m < n.
The security of RSA closely related to the computationally unfeasible problem
of large integer factorization. Informally, to decrypt c, we need private key d which
was calculated by using the Euclidean algorithm with public key e and secret φ(n).
Thus, we cannot get the private key without φ(n) as well as (p, q). Hence, to
decrypt c without knowing d, we must factorize n. In the initialization, the p and q
are large primes (1024-2048 bits) and thus, n is about 2048-4096 bits. Therefore, it
is computationally unfeasible under today’s knowledge to crack a well set-up RSA
cryptosystem.
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Digital Signatures

The digital signatures were introduced by Diffie and Hellman [DH76] and first
formalized by Goldwasser, Micali and Rivest [GMR88]. It was invented to authenticate a signer of messages or documents, and to ensure that the messages have not
been modified.

2.4.1

Formal Definition

Definition 2.4. (Digital signature) A digital signature scheme consists of three algorithms:
1. KeyGen(λ). Takes security parameter λ as input, outputs verifying/signing
key pair (P K, SK) for a signer.
2. SGen(m, SK). Takes message m and signing key SK of a signer as input,
and outputs a signature σ on message m.
3. SV er(m, σ, P K). Takes signer’s public key P K, message m and signature σ
as input, and outputs ‘valid’ iff the σ is signed by the signer on message m.
Otherwise, it outputs ‘invalid’ for rejection.
Formally, a signature scheme is called existentially unforgeable if any PPT adversary A can only win the following game, called Game-UFCMA, with a negligible
probability [GMR84, GMR88].
Definition 2.5. (Game-UFCMA) The Game-UFCMA has three phases which are
defined as follows:
• Initialization (P K, SK) ← KeyGen(λ). Given a security parameter λ, a
verifying/signing key pair is generated by the key generation algorithm and
adversary A is given the verifying key P K.
• Query σi ← SGen(SK, mi ). A runs up to qsign times to ask the signature
signing oracle in an adaptive manner. Each time, the signing oracle will reply
a signature σi for each message mi chosen by A, where 1 ≤ i ≤ qsign .
• Forge A outputs a new message and signature pair (m, σ). A wins if
1. SV er(pk, m, σ) = 1, i.e., σ is a valid signature for message m under the
public key P K.
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2. m 6= mi , for any i ∈ {1, · · · , qsign }.

2.4.2

RSA Signature Scheme

Since the concept of the digital signature was invented by Diffie and Hellman
[DH76], many signature schemes have been proposed. The RSA signature scheme
[RSA78] may be the earliest scheme, which comprises three algorithms defined as
follows.
• KeyGen(λ). Refer to the initialization phase of the RSA encryption scheme
in 2.3.2.
• SGen(m, d). To sign a message m, the signer generates the signature σ by
computing σ = h(m)d mod n.
• SV er(m, σ, e). Given a message m with a signature σ, the SV er outputs valid
iff h(m) = σ e mod n. Otherwise, it outputs invalid.
The primitive RSA signature scheme is not secure against certain attacks, e.g.
common-modulus attacks against RSA [DK02]. The Common-Modulus Attack has
been aimed at the case where two or more users of the RSA cryptosystem share the
same RSA modulus n, which leads to (a) a user’s secret key being able to recovered
by another user; (b) a user factoring n; and (c) an attacker recovering the plaintext.

2.4.3

Schnorr Signature Scheme

As one of most frequently used signature schemes, the Schnorr signature scheme
[Sch89, Sch91] is provably secure in a random oracle model under the assumption
that the discrete logarithm problem is intractable [BP02, PS96, PS00, Mao04]. We
now review the Schnorr signature scheme as follows.
• KeyGen(λ). The scheme is defined in a cyclic group G of order q with a
generator g ∈ Z∗p , where p and q are primes such that q|p − 1, q ≥ 2160 , and
p ≥ 21024 . A secure hash function h(·) is also selected. The private key is x
choosing from Z∗q , and the public key is y = g x mod p.
• SGen(m, x). To sign message m with private key x, a signer picks a random
integer r ∈ Z∗q , and outputs the signature σ = (a, e, s) by computing a = g r
mod p, e = h(a, m) and s = r + x · e mod q.
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• SV er(m, σ, y). Given a signature σ = (a, e, s) for message m with corresponding public key y, the verifier accepts this signature iff e ≡ h(a, m) and g s ≡ ay e
mod p.
The security of the Schnorr mechanism is based on the intractability of discrete
logarithm problem. The Schnorr signature scheme satisfies existential unforgeability
under chosen message attack [GMR84]. Its security has been discussed and proven
in [BP02, PS96, PS00, Mao04].

2.5

Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge

Zero-knowledge proof was proposed by [GMR85] and discussed in detail in [GMR89].
It is an interactive protocol which enables a prover to convince a verifier the truth
of an assertion, without revealing anything but the validity of proof. The zeroknowledge proof should satisfy three properties, namely completeness, soundness
and zero-knowledge (ZK-ness). The completeness guarantees that the verifier will
be convinced by a prover if the statement is true. The soundness ensures that the
verifier will never be convinced by any prover if the statement is false. The ZK-ness
requires that verifier can learn nothing but the fact.
Soon afterwards, a noninteractive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proof [CP92] was proposed and the proof of knowledge [BG92] was introduced. The proof of knowledge
is an interactive proof, enables a prover to convince a verifier that he knows some
secrets without showing the secrets to the verifier. If the proof of knowledge also
satisfies the properties of zero knowledge proof, then it can be called zero-knowledge
proof of knowledge (ZKPK).

2.5.1

RSA-based Verifiable Encryption of Signatures (RSAVES)

Verifiable encryption of signatures (VES) was proposed in 1999 for fair exchange.
V ES comprises three parties, two users (namely Alice and Bob) and a trusted party.
The basic idea of V ES is that Alice who has a key pair of signature schemes signs
a signature on a contract, encrypts it using the trusted party’s public key, and uses
the noninteractive signature-based proof of knowledge protocol [CP92] to convince
Bob that she has encrypted the signature in the ciphertext and the trusted party
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can recover it from the proof materials. After validating the proofs, Bob sends his
signature which is also on the contract to Alice and expects the signature from
Alice. For the purpose of fair exchange, Alice should send her signature back to
Bob after accepting Bob’s signature. If she does not do so, Bob can also get her
signature by sending Alice’s proof materials together with his own signature to the
trusted party who then recovers Alice’s signature and sends it to Bob, and in the
meanwhile, forwards Bob’s signature to Alice. Thus, the fair exchange is achieved.
In this thesis, we consider the case of RSA-VES such that the signer is working
over a cyclic subgroup with unknown order, but the length of this order is publicly
known. The RSA-VES, which is reviewed as follows, will be used in the chapter 3.
Initialization
Alice selects two large safe primes p and q to set n = pq. Namely, there are two
primes p0 and q 0 such that p = 2p0 + 1 and q = 2q 0 + 1. Alice then computes her
public key (e, n) where e > 2 is a prime, and her private key d such that ed ≡ 1
mod 2p0 q 0 . Alice also need to choose a cryptographic hash function h(·) such that
h : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}k , where 160 ≤ k ≤ n − 1. Now, Alice sends (e, n) to the trusted
party and publishes (e, n, h(·)).
Let Qn be the subgroup of squares in Z∗N , whose order #G = p0 q 0 is unknown to
the public but its bit-length lG = |N | − 2 is publicly known.
Upon receiving (e, n) from Alice, the trusted party checks its validity and randomly selects a g ∈ Z∗N if (e, n) is valid public key of Alice. To control the tightness
of the ZK proof, a security parameter  > 1 is chosen. Then, the trusted party randomly selects a secret key x, computes and sends public parameters g = g 2 mod n
and y = g x mod n to Alice. Finally, the trusted party publishes (, g, g, y).
Proof Generation
First, Alice need to sign an RSA-based signature on message m by computing
σ = h(m)2d mod n. To generate a proof of this signature, Alice first encrypts
it as K1 = σ · y r mod n and K2 = g r mod n, where r is a random integer with
binary length lG . Secondly, Alice computes two commitments a = (y e )r1 mod n and
b = g r1 mod n, where r1 is a also random number such that r1 ∈ ±{0, 1}(lG +k) .
Then, Alice computes the last part of proof (c, s) as c = h(m||y er ||K2 ||y e ||g||a||b)
and s = r1 − c · r (in Z). Finally, Alice sends the proof P = (K1 , K2 , a, b, c, s) as the
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whole proof to Bob.
Proof Verification
K1e
h(m)2

To verify the proof P , Bob calculates W =

mod n, a0 = (y e )s · (W )c

mod n, b0 = g s · K2c mod n, and checks whether (c, s) ∈ {0, 1}k × ±{0, 1}(lG +k)+1
and c = h(m||W ||K2 ||y e ||g||a0 ||b0 ) holds. If it does hold, then Bob signs a signature
σ 0 on hashed message h(m) and sends it to Alice.
Fair Exchange
The ZKP K is achieved until the last step. However, the RSA-VES was proposed
for fair exchange. Thus, after Bob sends his signature to Alice, a signature from
Alice is expected. If he has not received it, Bob can also obtain the signature with
the help of the trusted party by the following steps.
First, Bob sends message m together with his signature σ 0 and the encrypted
signature (K1 , K2 ) to the trusted party. The trusted party verifies Bob’s signature
first and if it is valid, then decrypts the signature by computing σ =
0

K1
.
K2x

Finally,

the trusted party sends σ to Bob and redirects σ to Alice. Thus, fair exchange is
achieved.

Chapter 3
Cryptanalysis of A Secure Single Sign-On
Scheme

3.1

Introduction

With the wide spread use of distributed computer networks, it has become common to allow users to access various network services offered by distributed service
providers [BX11]. Consequently, user authentication (also called user identification)
[Lam81, LC00] plays a crucial role in distributed computer networks to verify if a
user is legal and can therefore be granted access to the services requested. To avoid
bogus servers, users usually need to authenticate service providers. After mutual authentication, a session key may be negotiated to keep the confidentiality of the data
exchanged between a user and a service provider [LC00, JW09]. In many scenarios,
the anonymity of legal users must be protected as well [LC00]. However, practice
has shown that it is a big challenge to design efficient and secure authentication
protocols with these security properties in complex computer network environments
[CPS11].
Single sign-on (SSO) is a new authentication mechanism that enables a legal
user with a single credential to be authenticated by multiple service providers in
distributed computer network. Chang and Lee [CL12] made a careful study of
the SSO mechanism. First, they argued that the Hsu-Chuang user identification
scheme, actually an SSO scheme, has two weaknesses: (a) An outsider can forge a
valid credential by mounting a credential forging attack since the Hsu-Chang scheme
employs naive RSA signature without any hash function to issue a credential for any
random identity selected by a user (In fact, this feature based on [YWB+ 04].); and
(b) the Hsu-Chuang scheme requires clock synchronization since it uses a time stamp.
Then, Chang and Lee presented an interesting RSA-based SSO scheme, which is
highly efficient in computation and communication (So it is suitable for mobile
21
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devices), and does not rely on clock synchronization by using a nonce instead of a
time stamp. Finally, they presented a well-organized security analysis to show that
their SSO scheme supports secure mutual authentication, session key agreement,
and user anonymity.
This chapter, however, will demonstrate that their scheme is actually insecure
as it fails to meet credential privacy and soundness of authentication. Specifically,
we show that the Chang-Lee scheme [CL12] is actually insecure by presenting two
impersonation attacks, i.e., credential recovering attack and impersonation attack
without credentials. In the first attack, a malicious service provider who has communicated with a legal user twice can successfully recover the user’s credential.
Then, the malicious service provider can impersonate the user to access resources
and services provided by other service providers. The other attack may enable an
outside attacker without any valid credential to impersonate a legal user or even a
nonexistent user to have free access to the services. These two attacks imply that
the Chang-Lee SSO scheme fails to meet credential privacy and soundness, which
are essential requirements for SSO schemes and authentication protocols. We also
identify the flaws in their security arguments in order to explain why it is possible
to mount our attacks against their scheme. Similar attacks can also be applied to
the Hsu-Chuang scheme [HC09], on which the Chang-Lee scheme is based. Finally,
to avoid these two impersonation attacks we propose an improved SSO scheme to
enhance the user authentication phase of the Chang-Lee scheme. To this end, we
employ the efficient RSA-based verifiable encryption of signatures (VES) proposed
by Ateniese [Ate04] to verifiably and securely encrypt a user’s credential. In fact,
Ateniese’s VES was originally introduced to realize fair exchange.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section reviews the
Chang-Lee scheme [CL12]. After that, we present two attacks against the ChangLee scheme in Section 3.3, and briefly analyse the Hsu-Chuang scheme [HC09] in
Section 3.4. Then, the improved SSO scheme using VES is given in Section 3.5.
Finally, Section 3.6 draws some conclusions.

3.2

Review of the Chang-Lee Scheme

The Chang-Lee single sign-on scheme [CL12] is a remote user authentication
scheme, supporting session key establishment and user anonymity. In their scheme,
RSA cryptosystems are used to initialize a trusted authority, called an SCP C (smart
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SCP C
Ui , Pj
IDi , IDj
eX , dX
Si
Sx
Sy
EK (M )
DK (C)
σj (M, SKj )

SV er(M, σj , P Kj )
h(·)
||
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The trusted authority
User and Service provider, respectively
The unique identity of Ui and Pj , respectively
The public/private RSA key pair of identity X
The credential of Ui created by SCP C
The long term private key of SCP C
The public key of SCP C
A symmetric key encryption of
plaintext M using a key K
A symmetric key decryption of
ciphertext C using a key K
σj (SKj , M ) ← SGen(m, SK)
The signature σj on M signed
by Pj with signing key SKj via algorithm SGen(·)
The verifying of signature σj
on M with public key P Kj
A given one way hash function
The operation of concatenation

Table 3.1: Notations in the Chang-Lee Scheme
card producing center), and service providers, denoted as Pj ’s. The Diffie-Hellman
key exchange technique is employed to establish session keys. In the Chang-Lee
scheme, each user Ui applies a credential from the trusted authority SCP C, who
signs an RSA signature for the user’s hashed identity. After that, Ui uses a kind of
knowledge proof to show that he/she is in possession of the valid credential without
revealing his/her identity to eavesdroppers. Actually, this is the core idea of user
authentication in their scheme and also the reason why their scheme fails to achieve
secure authentication as we shall show shortly. On the other side, each Pj maintains
its own RSA key pair for doing server authentication. The Chang-Lee SSO scheme
consists of three phases: system initialization, registration, and user identification.
Table 3.1 explains notations, and the details of the Chang-Lee scheme are reviewed
as follows.

3.2.1

System Initialization Phase

The trusted authority SCP C first selects two large safe primes p and q, and then
sets N = pq. After that, SCP C determines its RSA key pair (e, d) such that ed = 1
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mod φ(N ), where φ(N ) = (p − 1)(q − 1). SCP C chooses a generator g ∈ Z∗n , where
n is also a large prime number. Finally, SCP C publishes (e, g, n, N ), keeps d as a
secret, and erases (p, q) immediately once this phase has been completed.

3.2.2

Registration Phase

In this phase, each user Ui chooses a unique identity IDi with a fixed bit-length,
and sends it to SCP C. After that, SCP C will return Ui the credential Si =
(IDi ||h(IDi ))d mod N , where || denotes a concatenation of two binary strings and
h(·) is a collision-resistant cryptographic one-way hash function. Here, both IDi
and Si must be transferred via a secure channel.
At the same time, each service provider Pj with identity IDj must maintain its
own RSA public parameters (ej , Nj ) and private key dj as does by SCP C.

3.2.3

User Identification Phase

To access the resources of service provider Pj , user Ui needs to go through the
authentication protocol specified in Fig.3.1. Here, k and t are random integers chosen
by Pj and Ui respectively; n1 , n2 and n3 are three random nonces; and E(·) denotes
a symmetric key encryption scheme which is used to protect the confidentiality of
user Ui ’s identity IDi . We highlight this phase as follows.
• Upon receiving service request message m1 from user Ui , service provider Pj
generates and returns user message m2 which is made up primarily by its RSA
signature on (Z, IDj , n1 ). Once this signature is validated, it means that user
Ui has authenticated service provider Pj successfully. Here, Z = g k mod n is
the temporal Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange material issued by Pj .
• After that, user Ui correspondingly generates his/her temporal DH key exh(Kij ||w||n2 )

change material w = g t mod n and issues proof x = Si

Kij = h(IDi ||kij ) is the derived session key and kij = Z

t

, where

mod n = wk

mod n = g kt mod n is the raw key obtained by using the DH key exchange
technique.
h(Kij ||w||n2 )

• Proof x = Si

is used to convince Pj that Ui does hold valid credential

Si without revealing the value of Si . Namely, after receiving message m3 service
h(Kij ||w||n2 )

provider Pj can confirm x’s validity by checking if SIDi

mod N = xe
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Figure 3.1: User Identification Phase of the Chang-Lee Scheme
mod N , where SIDi = (IDi ||h(IDi )). Once this quality holds, it means that
user Ui has been authenticated successfully by service provider Pj . It is worth
noting that proof x is designed in a particular way so that except Pj and Ui ,
no one else can verify it as both Ui ’s identity IDi and the newly established
session key Kij are used to produce x. This aims to achieve user anonymity
as no eavesdropper can learn the values of IDi and Kij .
• Finally, message m4 (i.e. h(n3 )) is employed to show that Pj has obtained
message m3 correctly, which implies the success of mutual authentication and
session key establishment.
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Attacks Against the Chang-Lee Scheme

As can be seen from the above, it seems that the Chang-Lee SSO scheme achieves
secure mutual authentication since server authentication is done by using traditional
RSA signature issued by service provider Pj and without valid credential Si it looks
impossible for an attacker to impersonate a legal user Ui by going through the user
authentication procedure.
It can be seen from the following, however, that the Chang-Lee scheme is actually not a secure SSO scheme because there are two potential effective and concrete
impersonation attacks. The first attack, the ‘credential recovering attack’, compromises the credential privacy in the Chang-Lee scheme as a malicious service provider
is able to recover the credential of a legal user. The other attack, an ‘impersonation
attack without credentials’, demonstrates how an outside attacker may be able to
freely make use of resources and services offered by service providers, since the attacker can successfully impersonate a legal user without holding a valid credential
and thus violate the requirement of soundness for an SSO scheme. In real life, these
attacks may put both users and service providers at high risk.
We now first describe our attacks together with the assumptions required, justify
why these assumptions are reasonable, and finally discuss why the security analysis
and proofs given in [CL12] are not enough to guarantee the security of the Chang-Lee
SSO scheme.

3.3.1

Credential Recovering Attack

Intuitively, the Chang-Lee SSO scheme seems to satisfy the requirement of credential privacy since receiving credential proof x = Sih2 mod N , where h2 denotes
h(Kij ||w||n2 ), does not allow service provider Pj to recover user Ui ’s credential Si
−1

by computing Si = xh2

−1
mod φ(N ). In fact, the
mod N , where h−1
2 refers to h2

difficulty of calculating h−1
2 from the given (e, N, x, h) is the exact rationale why the
RSA cryptosystem is secure, i.e., it should be intractable for an attacker to derive
the RSA private key from the public key (and a given ciphertext). This is because
here we could treat (h2 , h−1
2 ) as another RSA public/private key pair w.r.t the same
RSA modulus N . Moreover, directly recovering Si from x = Sih2 mod N also looks
impossible as this seems equivalent to decrypting the RSA ciphertext x w.r.t. the
(ephemeral) public key h2 .
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Nevertheless, there is a pitfall in the production of proof x = Sih2 mod N as here
the same credential Si is encrypted multiple times under different (ephemeral) public
keys h2 w.r.t. the same RSA modulus N . Consequently, under the assumption that
malicious service provider Pj has run the Chang-Lee SSO scheme with the same user
Ui twice, Pj will be able to recover Ui ’s credential Si with high probability by using
the extended Euclidean algorithm. Namely, Pj can solve Si from two equations
h0

x = Sih2 mod N and x0 = Si 2 mod N . The details of the attack, which share some
features of common-modulus attacks against RSA [DK02], are given as follows:
1. After successfully running the Chang-Lee SSO scheme twice with the same
user Ui , malicious service provider Pj stores all messages exchanged in these
two instances, denoted as (IDi , x, Kij , w, n2 , · · · ) for the first instance, and
(IDi , x0 , Kij0 , w0 , n02 , · · · ) for the second instance.
2. By denoting h2 = h(Kij ||w||n2 ) and h02 = h(Kij0 ||w0 ||n02 ), Pj first checks if h2
and h02 are co-prime, i.e. if gcd(h2 , h02 ) = 1. In the case that gcd(h2 , h02 ) = 1,
Pj then runs the extended Euclidean algorithm to compute two integers a and
b such that a · h2 + b · h02 = 1 (in Z). Finally, malicious Pj can recover Ui ’s
credential Si by computing
Si = xa · x0b

mod N.

(1)

Eq. (1) is justified by the following equalities:
xa · x0b

h0

mod N = (Sih2 )a · (Si 2 )b
=
=

a·h +b·h02
Si 2
Si1 mod

mod N

mod N
N

= Si .
3. If gcd(h2 , h02 ) 6= 1, Pj needs to run more instances with Ui so that it can get
two instances such that gcd(h2 , h02 ) = 1.
There are a number of comments to be made regarding the above attacks. First,
it has a success rate of about 60% due for two reasons: (a) for two randomly selected
integers u and v, the probability that gcd(u, v) = 1 holds is 6/π 2 ≈ 0.6 [Ten95, Wei];
and (b) as the outputs of hash function h, h2 and h02 can be regarded as random
numbers. This means that after executing the Chang-Lee SSO scheme with the

3.3. Attacks Against the Chang-Lee Scheme

28

same user Ui twice, malicious Pj will be able to recover Ui ’s credential Si with a
probability of about 0.6. Consequently, it is easy to see that after running the scheme
with Ui a couple of times, Pj can recover Si almost certainly. Second, it is not hard
to see that the above attack could be mounted by two or multiple malicious service
providers who collude together once they put the values of h2 together. Finally, the
attack will lead to serious consequences since after recovering the valid credential
of a legal user, malicious Pj can impersonate this user by running Chang-Lee SSO
scheme in the same way as a legal user does to freely make use of the services offered
by other service providers.
How could service provider Pj be malicious and then mount the above attack?
On the one hand, the Chang-Lee SSO scheme specifies that SCP C is the trusted
party (refer to Section IV A [CL12]). So, this implies that service providers are
not trusted parties and that they could be malicious. By agreeing with Yang et al.
[YWB+ 04], when they said that “the Wu-Hsu’s modified version cold not protect the
user’s token against a malicious service provider, ...”, [CL12] also implicitly agrees
that there is the potential for attacks from malicious service providers against SSO
schemes. Moreover, if all service providers are assumed to be trusted, to identify
him/herself user Ui can simply encrypt his/her credential Si under the RSA public
key of service provider Pi . Then, Pi can easily decrypt this ciphertext to get Ui ’s
credential and verify its validity by checking if it is a correct signature issued by
SCP C. In fact, such a straightforward scheme with strong assumption is much
simpler, more efficient and has better security, at least against this type of attack.
On the other hand, according to the security models given in [YWB+ 04] and
[HMSY10], malicious service providers could be attackers in SSO schemes. In fact,
this is a traditional as well as prudential way to deal with trustworthiness, since we
cannot simply assume that beside the trusted authority SCP C, all service providers
are also trusted. The basic reason is that assuming the existence of a trusted party
is the strongest supposition in cryptography but it is usually very costly to develop
and maintain. In particular, Han et al. [HMSY10] defined collusion impersonation
attacks as a way to capture the scenarios in which malicious service providers may
recover a user’s credential and then impersonate the user to login to other service
providers. It is easy to see that the above credential recovery attack is simply
a special case of collusion impersonation attack where a single malicious service
provider can recover a user’s credential.
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Impersonation Attack Without Credentials

We now study the soundness of the Chang-Lee SSO scheme, which seems to
satisfy this security requirement as well. The main reason is that to get valid proof
x satisfying SIDih2 mod N = xe mod N for a random hash output h2 , there seems
−1

no other way but to compute x by x = SIDih2 ·e

mod N , i.e., x = (SIDid )h2 or

x = (Si )h2 mod N . Therefore, an attacker should not be able to log in to any
service provider if it does not have the knowledge of either SCP C’s RSA private
key d or user Ui ’s credential Si .
Again, however, such a plausible discussion simply explains the rationale of the
Chang-Lee SSO scheme but cannot guarantee its security w.r.t. the soundness. This
is also the essential reason why the current focus of research in information security
is on formal proofs which rigorously show the security of cryptosystems. Indeed,
no one can formally prove that without knowing either SCP C’s RSA private key d
or user Ui ’s credential Si , it is unfeasible to compute a proof x that passes through
authentication, as an outside attacker is able to get a shortcut if the SCP C’s RSA
public key e is a small integer so that e’s binary length is less than the output length
of hash function h, i.e., |e| < |h(·)|. The attack is explained in detail as follows:
1. To impersonate legal user Ui with identity IDi for accessing service provider
Pj , an attacker E first sends Pj request message m1 normally, as Ui does.
2. Upon receiving message m2 from Pj , E then checks Pj ’s signature and chooses
a random integer t to compute (kij , Kij , w). Before moving on to the next
step, attacker E needs to check whether h(Kij ||w||n2 ) is divisible by e. If not,
E has to choose another t or start a new session to satisfy this condition.
3. As h(Kij ||w||n2 ) is divisible by e, let h(Kij ||w||n2 ) = e · b for some integer
b ∈ Z. Now, E computes x by x = SIDib , where SIDi = IDi ||h(IDi )
4. Finally, E can impersonate user Ui to pass the authentication by sending m3 =
h(Kij ||w||n2 )

(w, x, y) to Pj , since Pj will notice that SIDi
h(Kij ||w||n2 )

This is because we have: SIDi

mod N = xe mod N .

mod N = SIDib·e mod N = xe

mod N .
There are a number of things worth noting in regard to the above impersonation
attack without credentials. First, the attack will succeed at a rate of about 1/e for
one random number t in a new session. The reason is that e|h(Kij ||w||n2 ) holds
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with a probability of about 1/e, since |e| < |h(·)| and the output of hash function
h can be treated as random numbers. Consequently, if e = 3 the above attack can
succeed once by trying about three values of t on average. Even if e is as large
as 65537(= 216 + 1), trying 65537 times to get a successful impersonation may not
be difficult for attacker E as it may explore a machine, which can be much more
powerful than a mobile device, to do the computations needed for each try, i.e., two
modular exponentiations and two hash evaluations. Moreover, even when timeout
is introduced into the Chang-Lee scheme it may be not a real obstacle for attacker
E as it can initialize new sessions (w.r.t. the same or different identities).
Second, in the above attack we assume that e is a small integer and attacker E
may know the value of one legal user’s identity IDi . This is reasonable as explained
below. On the one hand, in the system initialization phase (Section IV-A) the
Chang-Lee scheme only specifies that the trusted party SCP C needs to set its RSA
key pair (e, d) but does not give any limitation on the length of public exponent e.
So, e could be a small integer with binary length less than the output length of hash
function h, i.e., |e| < |h(·)|. Moreover, in practice this is likely to happen because:
(a) to speed up the RSA signature verification, some security standards (e.g. PKCS
#1 [PKC]), academic papers (e.g. [Bon99]) and popular web sites ((e.g. wikipedia
[Wik12b])) suggest that e can be set as 3 or 65537; and (b) as the Chang-Lee scheme
is claimed to be efficient even for mobile devices in distributed networks, using small
exponent e can provide further computational advantage for these devices as they
usually have limited resources for computation and storage [XSK+ 05]. In addition,
the security analysis given in [CL12] neither excludes the case of small e nor relies
on the concrete procedure of setting SCP C’s RSA key pair (e, d).
On the other hand, in the Chang-Lee SSO scheme users’ identities are not as
crucial as their credentials, though the identities are transferred in ciphertext to
provide user anonymity. So, users’ identities could be known by an attacker due
to reasons, such as users’ negligence. At least service providers know users’ identities. Moreover, even if users’ identities are well protected so that attacker E cannot
impersonate registered user Ui as above, E can freely forge an identity ID. This
is possible because in the Chang-Lee scheme, each user selects his/her identity by
following only one requirement: each identity is a string with fixed bit-length. Therefore, even an outside attacker E can use an arbitrary such string as an identity to
mount the above attack, since the service providers are not provided any additional
mechanism to check whether identity ID has been registered with SCP C. This also
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implies that if e is a small integer, E can even impersonate a nonexistent user to
make use of the resources and services offered by service providers.
Finally, it must be emphasized that impersonation attacks without valid credentials seriously violate the security of SSO schemes as it allows attacker to be
successfully authenticated without first obtaining a valid credential from the trusted
authority after registration. In other words, it means that in an SSO scheme suffering these attacks there are alternatives which enable passing through authentication
without credentials.

3.3.3

Discussion

In [CL12], Chang and Lee provided a well-organized security analysis to show
that their SSO scheme is secure. However, the two impersonation attacks presented
in the previous section mean that their SSO scheme is actually not secure. So, why
is their analysis not enough to guarantee the security of their scheme? What is
the security flaw in their scheme leading to the above attacks? And what could we
learn from these attacks to prevent similar situations in the future design of SSO
schemes? These are the topics of this section.
In [CL12], the security of the Chang-Lee SSO scheme has been analysed in three
different ways: 1. BAN logic [BAN90] was used to show the correctness of the
Chang-Lee scheme; 2. Informal security arguments were given to demonstrate that
their scheme can resist some attacks, including impersonation attacks. 3. A formal
security proof was given to prove that their scheme is a secure authenticated key
exchange (AKE) protocol [BR93a]. However, these security analyses and proofs still
do not guarantee the full security of the Chang-Lee scheme and there are a number
of reasons for this. First, as early as the 1990s it was known that although BAN
logic had been shown useful to identify some attacks, it could approve protocols
which are actually unsound in practice because of some technical weaknesses in the
logic [BM94]. Moreover, in [CL12] the authors did not give details to show how the
BAN logic can be used to prove that their scheme guarantees mutual authentication. In fact, at the end of section V-A of [CL12], the authors claimed to be able
to: “prove that Ui and Pj are able to authenticate each other using our protocol.”
but they provided no argument to show why each party could not be impersonated
by an attacker. Second, the authors did discuss informally why their scheme could
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withstand impersonation attacks by considering two scenarios, for example, an attacker re-uses previous nonce n2 to forge message m3 or selects random credential
Si to compute SIDi by SIDi = Sie mod N . However, such informal arguments
neither strongly confirm their scheme’s security against these two concrete attacks
nor exclude the existence of other scenarios of impersonation attacks, such as those
presented in previous sections. Finally, their formal proof about AKE only focuses
on the session key security, i.e., an attacker with all reasonable resources is not able
to know the session key established between the two parties under the computational
Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption (refer to Theorem 1 in [CL12], not the security of
mutual authentication. According to the definitions given by Bellare and Rogaway
[BR93a], one fundamental requirement of a secure AKE protocol is that there be a
secure mutual authentication in the first place.
From the above, we can see that it is the use of credential proof x = Sih2 mod N
which leads to the above two attacks against the Chang-Lee SSO scheme. More
specifically, x = Sih2 mod N is a kind of knowledge proof which shows that a
prover (usually played by user Ui ) knows credential Si . However, this is not a secure
proof as a malicious verifier (i.e. service provider Pj ) can recover Si and an outside
attacker may be able to get authenticated without a credential. Based on this
observation, a natural improvement on the Chang-Lee scheme would be to replace
non-interactive proof x by a rigorous but interactive zero knowledge (ZK) proof
[FFS88] that shows the prover’s knowledge of secret Si = SIDid mod N without
revealing any additional information about credential Si . In other words, using the
verifiably encrypted signature introduced in [CM00], user Ui can encrypt his/her
credential Si under the public key of a trusted party and verifiably convince service
provider Pj that the ciphertext does contain Si w.r.t. Ui ’s identity IDi without
allowing Pj to get any additional information about credential Si . Compared with
two modular exponentiations used for generating and verifying proof x, however,
ZK proofs for showing the possession of an RSA signature usually require hundreds
of modulo exponentiations [ASW00, CM00] since these proofs rely on inefficient ‘cut
and choose’ method, i.e., binary challenges.
From the two attacks presented above, we can learn that both credential privacy
and soundness are crucial for SSO schemes. As mentioned in Section III-A, credential
privacy has been studied in Yang et. al [YWB+ 04] and Han et al. [HMSY10]. To
the best of our knowledge, however, there is surprisingly, no existing research which
has given a careful treatment of soundness. For example, Han et al. [HMSY10] did
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not investigate soundness, though they did carefully study how to formally define
credential forgery and recovery attacks from outsiders, users, service providers and
their potential collusion. According to the most traditional form of authentication,
a user will be authenticated if he/she can provide a valid pair of user name and
password (i.e. credential), and soundness is obviously satisfied because a user is
not able to go through authentication without providing a valid credential which
is registered and maintained by a server. In complex scenarios, like the Chang-Lee
scheme, the situation may be less obvious and, in fact, quite challenging. For this
reason, the problem remains an open one for future study. The question of formally
defining the soundness of SSO/authentication schemes and rigorously proving them
for concrete solutions remains an interesting and important one.
Finally, it must be noted that the analysis above shows only that the Chang-Lee
SSO scheme fails to achieve secure authentication, without violating its security for
achieving user anonymity and session key privacy.

3.4

Attacks on the Hsu-Chuang Scheme

In this section, we briefly highlight the difference between the Chang-Lee scheme
[CL12] and the Hsu-Chuang scheme [HC09] to see why the above describe impersonation attacks apply to this latter as well. The two schemes have similar structures
and use similar notations, but the technical details differ. In summary, the HsuChuang scheme is differs from the Chang-Lee scheme in three ways. First, in the
Hsu-Chuang scheme user Ui ’s credential Si is a naive RSA signature signed by the
trusted party SCP C, i.e., Si = IDid mod N , where IDi is Ui ’s identity selected
by him/herself. Second, to authenticate itself, service provider Pj sends signature
h(Z||T1 ||IDj )·dj

u = gj

mod Nj , where Z is the DH key material generated by Pj , T1

is the current timestamp, and IDj is Pj ’s identity. Finally, for user authentication
h(Kij ||Z||w||T2 )

user Ui issues and sends proof x = Si
checking if

h(K ||Z||w||T2 )
IDi ij

=x

e

mod N to Pj , who validates x by

mod N . For more detail, see [HC09] or Section II

of [CL12].
As pointed out in [CL12], the Hsu-Chuang scheme is vulnerable to impersonation
attack as an attacker can forge a valid credential Si w.r.t. identity IDi by simply
selecting random Si ∈ Z∗N and then computing IDi = Sie mod N . This attack can
be excluded if a specific encoding format is required for identities and the credential
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is issued by using a secure hash h, i.e., Si = h(IDi )d mod N , as in the ChangLee scheme. According to the discussion in Section III, the Hsu-Chuang scheme is
still not secure even with such a countermeasure. The reason is that our two attacks against the Chang-Lee scheme apply to the Hsu-Chuang scheme as well. This
means that the Hsu-Chuang scheme also fails to satisfy both credential privacy and
soundness of authentication. In addition, there is another flaw in the Hsu-Chuang
scheme. Attacker E can impersonate service provider Pj to cheat legal users, as
the service authentication is conducted by using a non-traditional RSA signature,
h(Z||T1 ||IDj )·dj

u = gj

mod Nj . By communicating with Pj twice attacker E can get
h(Z||T1 ||IDj )·dj

messages (Z, T1 , IDj , u) and (Z 0 , T10 , IDj , u0 ) so that u = gj
0

and u =

h(Z 0 ||T10 ||IDj0 )·dj
gj

mod Nj . Once gcd(h(Z||T1 ||IDj ), h(Z

0

mod Nj

||T10 ||IDj ))

= 1

(this holds with probability about 0.6), E can find two integers a and b such
d

that a · h(Z||T1 ||IDj ) + b · h(Z||T1 ||IDj ) = 1. Hence, E can recover gj j mod Nj
d

by computing gj j mod Nj = ua u0b mod Nj . After that, E can impersonate Pj
d

d

to any legal user by using the value of gj j mod Nj to issue signature u = (gj j
mod Nj )h(Z||T1 ||IDj ) , without knowing Pj ’s RSA private key dj .

3.5

Proposed Improvement

To overcome the flaws in the Chang-Lee scheme [CL12], an RSA-based verifiable
encryption of signatures (RSA-VES) can be employed. This is an efficient primitive
introduced in [Ate04] for realizing fair exchange of RSA signatures.
The basic idea of the improved scheme can be highlighted as follows. User Ui ’s
credential is Si = h(IDi )2d mod N , i.e., SCPC’s RSA signature on the square of
the hashed user identity (in contrast to Si = h(IDi )d mod N in [CL12]). For user
authentication, Ui will encrypt his/her credential Si using ElGamal encryption of
SCPC’s other public key y = g u by computing P1 = Si · y r mod N and P2 = g r
mod N , where g ∈ Z∗N of big order and u is SCPC’s secret decryption key. In this
improvement, SCPC also plays the role of the trust authority in VES. To convince
a service provider that (P1 , P2 ) does encrypt his/her credential Si (i.e. SCPC’s RSA
signature for IDi ), Ui must also provide an NZK proof x to show that he or she knows
a secret r such that

P1e
h(IDi )2

= (y e )r mod N and P2 = g r mod N . Such a proof x, is

called ‘proving the equality of two discrete logarithms in a group of unknown order’
[Ate04], will convince the service provider without leaking any useful information
about Ui ’s credential Si . For server authentication, service providers can simply
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issue signatures as did [CL12], though the proposed changes give service providers
the freedom to employ any secure signature scheme. The other procedures are the
same as in the Chang-Lee scheme.

3.5.1

Initialization Phase

SCPC selects two large safe primes p and q to set N = pq. Namely, there are
two primes p0 and q 0 such that p = 2p0 + 1 and q = 2q 0 + 1. SCPC now sets its
RSA public/private key pair (e, d) such that ed ≡ 1 mod 2p0 q 0 , where e is a prime.
Let QN be the subgroup of squares in Z∗N whose order #G = p0 q 0 is unknown to
the public but its bit-length lG = |N | − 2 is publicly known. SCPC randomly
picks generator g of QN , selects an ElGamal decryption key u, and computes the
corresponding public key y = g u mod N . In addition, for completing the DiffieHellman key exchange SCPC chooses generator g ∈ Z∗N , where n is another large
prime number. SCPC also chooses a cryptographic hash function h(·) : {0, 1}∗ →
{0, 1}k , where security parameter k satisfies 160 ≤ k ≤ |N | − 1. Another security
parameter  > 1 is chosen to control the tightness of the ZK proof [GAT00]. Finally,
SCPC publishes (e, N, h(·), , g, y, g, n), and keeps (d, u) secret.

3.5.2

Registration Phase

In this phase, upon receiving a register request, SCP C gives Ui fixed-length
unique identity IDi , and issues credential Si = h(IDi )2d mod n. Si calculated as
SCPC’s RSA signature on h(IDi )2 is an element of QN , which will be the main
group we are calculating.
As in [CL12], each service provider Pj with identity IDj should maintain a
pair of signing/verifying keys for a secure signature scheme (not necessarily RSA).
σj (M sg, SKj ) denotes the signature σj on message M sg signed by Pj using signing key SKj . SV er(M sg, σj , P Kj) denotes verifying of signature σj with public
key P Kj , which outputs ‘1’ or ‘0’ to indicating if the signature is valid or invalid,
respectively.

3.5.3

Authentication Phase

In this phase, RSA-VES is employed to authenticate a user, while a normal
signature is used for service provider authentication. The details are illustrated in
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Fig. 3.2 and further explained as follows:
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P2  g r mod N
a  ( y e ) r1 mod N
b  g r1 mod N
c  h ( K ij || w || n2 || y er
|| P2 || y e || g || a || b )
s  r1  c  r (in Ζ )
x  ( P1 , P2 , a , b, c , s )
CT  E  ij ( IDi || n3 || n2 )

m3  (w, x, CT )

kij  wk mod n
 ij  h( ID j || kij )
( IDi || n3 || n2 )  D ij (CT )
y er  P1e / h( IDi )2 mod N
a  ( y e ) s  ( y er )c mod N
b  g s  ( P2 )c mod N
?

c  h( Kij || w || n2 || y er
?

V  h ( n3 )

m4  (V )

|| P2 || y e || g || a || b)
V  h(n3 )

Figure 3.2: The Proposed Improved Scheme
1. Ui sends a service request with nonce n1 to service provider Pj ,
2. Upon receiving (Req, n1 ), Pj calculates its session key material Z = g k mod n
where k ∈ Z∗N is a random number, sets u = Z||IDj ||n1 , issues a signature
v = σj (u, SKj ), and then sends m2 = (Z, v, n2 ) to the user, where n2 is a
nonce selected by Pj .
3. Upon receiving m2 , Ui sets u = Z||IDj ||n1 . Ui terminates the conversation if
SV er(u, v, P Kj ) = 0. Otherwise, Ui accepts service provider Pj because the
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signature is valid. In this case, Ui selects a random number t ∈ Z∗n to compute
w = g t mod n, kij = Z t mod n, and the session key Kij = h(IDj ||kij ). For
user authentication, Ui first encrypts his/her credential Si as P1 = Si · y r
mod N , P2 = g r mod N , where r is a random integer with binary length lG .
Next, Ui computes two commitments a = (y e )r1 mod N and b = g r1 mod N ,
where r1 ∈ ±{0, 1}(lG +k) is also a random number. After that, Ui computes the
evidence showing that credential Si has been encrypted in (P1 , P2 ) under public
key y. For this purpose, Ui calculates c = h(Kij ||w||n2 ||y er ||P2 ||y e ||g||a||b) and
s = r1 − c · r (in Z). Then, x = (P1 , P2 , a, b, c, s) is the NIZK proof for user
authentication. In fact, it is precisely, the processes of generating x which
is the proof part of RSA-VES [Ate04]. Finally, Ui encrypts his/her identity
IDi , new nonce n3 , and Pj ’s nonce n2 using session key Ki j to get ciphertext
CT = EKij (IDi ||n3 ||n2 ), and thereafter sends m3 = (w, x, CT ) to service
provider Pj .
4. To verify Ui , Pj calculates kij = wk mod n, the session key Kij = h(IDj ||kij ),
and then uses Kij to decrypt CT and recover (IDi , n3 , n2 ). Then, Pj computes
y er = P1e /h(IDi )2 mod N , a = (y e )s · (y er )c mod N , b = g s · (P2 )c mod N ,
and checks if (c, s) ∈ {0, 1}k ×±{0, 1}(lG +k) and c = h(Kij ||w||n2 ||y er ||P2 ||y e ||g
||a||b). If the output is negative, Pj aborts the conversation. Otherwise, Pj
accepts Ui and believes that they have shared the same session key Ki j by
sending Ui m4 = (V ) where V = h(n3 ).
5. After Ui receives V , he checks if V = h(n3 ). If this is true, then Ui believes
that they share the same session key Kij . Otherwise, Ui terminates the conversation.

3.5.4

Security Discussion

We now analyse the security of the improved SSO scheme by focusing on the
security of the user authentication part, especially soundness and credential privacy
due to two reasons. On the one hand, the unforgeability of the credential is guaranteed by the unforgeability of RSA signatures, and the security of service provider
authentication is ensured by the unforgeability of the secure signature scheme chosen by each service provider. On the other hand, other security properties (e.g., user
anonymity and session key privacy) are preserved, since these properties have been
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formally proved in [CL12] and the corresponding parts of the Chang-Lee scheme are
kept unchanged.
Soundness requires that without holding valid credential S ∗ corresponding to a
target user U ∗ , an attacker, who could be a collusion of users and service providers,
has at most a negligible probability of generating proof x∗ and going through user
authentication by impersonating user U ∗ . The soundness of the above improved
SSO scheme relies on the soundness of the NIZK proof, which also guarantees the
soundness of RSA-VES, defined as the second property of Definition 1 in [Ate04].
Namely, if the user authentication part is not sound, i.e., an attacker can present
valid proof x∗ without holding the corresponding credential S ∗ in non-negligible
probability, then this implies the NIZK proof of proving equality of two discrete
logarithms in a group of unknown order is not sound, contradictory to the analysis
given in Section 3.7 of [Ate04].
Credential privacy or credential irrecoverableness requires that there be a negligible probability of an attacker recovering a valid credential from the interactions
with a user. Again this property can be deduced from the signature hiding property
of RSA-VES, defined as the third property of Definition 1 in [Ate04]. Signature
hiding means that an attacker cannot extract a signature from VES without help
from the user who encrypted the signature or the trusted authority who can decrypt
a VES. So, if this improved SSO scheme fails to meet credential privacy, it implies
that Ateniese’s RSA-VES fails to satisfy signature hiding, which is contrary to the
analysis given in Section 3.7 of [Ate04]. In fact, soundness and signature hiding
are the two core security properties to guarantee the fairness of digital signature
exchange using VES.
More rigorous security proofs require to first formally define these two properties,
and these are interesting topics for further study.

3.6

Conclusion

In this chapter, we demonstrated two effective impersonation attacks on Chang
and Lee’s single sign-on (SSO) scheme [CL12]. The first attack shows that their
scheme cannot protect the privacy of a user’s credential, and thus, a malicious
service provider can impersonate a legal user in order to enjoy the resources and
services from other service providers. The second attack violates the soundness
of authentication by giving an outside attacker without credential the chance to
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impersonate even a non-existent user and then freely access resources and services
provided by service providers. We also discussed why their well-organised security
arguments are not strong enough to guarantee the security of their SSO scheme. In
addition, we explained why Hsu and Chuang’s scheme [HC09] is also vulnerable to
these attacks. In addition, by employing an efficient verifiable encryption of RSA
signatures introduced by Ateniese [Ate04], we proposed an improved the Chang-Lee
scheme to achieve soundness and credential privacy. The unresolved problems for
future work are to formally define authentication soundness and construct efficient
and provably secure single sign-on schemes.

Chapter 4
A Provably Secure Single Sign-On
Scheme

4.1

Introduction

As suggested in the previous chapter, it is necessary to formally define the soundness of authentication and to construct efficient and provably secure single sign-on
schemes for mobile device users in distributed systems and networks. To design a
secure SSO scheme, intuitively, there are three basic security requirements which
should be considered: completeness, soundness and credential privacy. Completeness of authentication [BR93a] requires that: (a) both sides accept each other if
they have matched the conversation; (b) the probability that one side accepts the
other one who actually has not engaged in the matching conversation is negligible. Soundness means that an unregistered user without a credential should not be
able to access the services offered by service providers. Credential privacy guarantees that colluding dishonest service providers should not be able to fully recover a
user’s credential and then impersonate the user to log in to other service providers.
Soundness of credential based authentication, however, has not been formally studied yet although it is important, and the preserving of both soundness and credential
privacy is still a challenge in designing SSO [WYX12].
In 2010, Han et al. [HMSY10] proposed a generic construction of SSO schemes.
This construction relies on broadcast encryption plus zero knowledge (ZK) proof
[FFS88] showing that the prover knows the corresponding private key of a given
public key. So, implicitly, each user is assumed to have been issued a public key in
a public key infrastructure (PKI). In the setting of an RSA cryptosystem, however,
such ZK proof is very inefficient due to the complexity of interactive communications between the prover (a user) and the verifier (a service provider). In addition,

40

4.2. Formal Model

41

the requirement of PKI services for each user imposes a heavy burden on the implementation of SSO scheme. The function of session key establishment is also desired
in order to secure the further communication.
In order to solve these problems, this chapter first formally defines the single signon schemes with authenticated key exchange. Then, we propose an SSO scheme according to the formal model by exploiting the Schnorr signature due to its simplicity
and unforgeability [GMR89, Mao04]. In particular, this scheme uses Schnorr signature to generate a user’s credential and then, to authenticate him/her the user uses
his/her credential as a private key to issue a Schnorr signature on some information
generated in each session. As did in Chang-Lee scheme, a variant of Diffie-Hellman
key exchange mechanism is employed to establish the session key. Furthermore, the
security of the proposed protocol is discussed.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section specifies a
formal model for SSO with a unified definition of soundness and credential privacy.
The proposed SSO scheme is given in section 4.3. The security of the proposed
protocol is discussed in section 4.4. Finally, section 4.5 concludes this chapter.

4.2

Formal Model

In this section we present a formal model to define single sign-on schemes which
support session key establishment. This model called authenticated key exchange
single sign-on (AKESSO). This section also provides the security requirements of
AKESSO. In particular, we list the components (e.g. syntax) of AKESSO, define
correctness, describe an adversary model, and formally specify three security properties, including secure credential-based user authentication, secure credential-based
service provider authentication, and session key security.
Definition 4.1. An authenticated key exchange single sign-on (AKESSO)
scheme is comprised of trusted credential provider (TCP), group of service providers
P and group of users U . It consists of eight algorithms and protocol: initialization
algorithm Init(·), identity generation algorithm IdGen(·), credential generation algorithm CGen(·), credential verification algorithm CV er(·), user proof generation
algorithm U P Gen(·), user proof verification algorithm U P V er(·), service provider
proof generation algorithm SP P Gen(·), and service provider proof verification algoQ
rithm SP P V er(·), and key exchange protocol .
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1. Init(λ): Taking security parameter λ0 (or λ1 ) as input, outputs the public/private key pair (P K, SK) for TCP (or (P Kj , SKj ) for Pj ∈ P ).
2. IdGen(RIi ): Taking registration information RIi as input, outputs unique
identity IDi for user Ui ∈ U .
3. CGen(IDi , SK): Taking identity IDi and TCP’s private key SK as input,
outputs credential Ci for user Ui .
4. CV er(Ci , IDi , P K): Taking credential Ci , identity IDi , and TCP’s public
key P K as input, outputs ‘1’ or ‘0’ for accepting or rejecting credential Ci
respectively.
5. U P Gen(Ci , IDi , P K, M ): Taking credential Ci , identity IDi , TCP’s public
key P K and temporal message M generated in a session as input, outputs
user proof upi showing user Ui ’s knowledge of credential Ci .
6. U P V er(upi , IDi , P K, M ): Taking user proof upi , identity IDi , TCP’s public
key P K, and temporal message M generated in a session as input, outputs ‘1’
or ‘0’ for accepting or rejecting upi as a valid credential proof w.r.t. identity
IDi respectively.
7. SP P Gen(SKj , M 0 ): Taking service provider Pj ’s private key SKj and temporal message M 0 generated in a session as input, outputs service provider proof
sppj showing Pj ’s knowledge of SKj .
8. SP P V er(sppj , P Kj , M 0 ): Taking service provider proof sppj , Pj ’s public key
P Kj , and temporal message M 0 generated in a session as input, outputs ‘1’ or
‘0’ for accepting or rejecting sppj as a valid service provider proof w.r.t. public
key P Kj respectively.
9.

Q

: This is a key exchange protocol run by user Ui with private input Ci and

service provider Pj with private input SKj . After the completion of each protocol instance, Ui will output session key Kij if he/she accepts Pj . Similarly,
after the completion of each protocol instance Pj will output session key Kji if
it accepts Ui . (Ideally, Kij and Kji are expected to be the same value.)
Remark 4.1. The above definition focuses on public key based AKESSO with noninteractive proofs. It could be extended to support interactive proofs, where spi and
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sspj are generated by interactive protocols run by user Ui and service provider Pj .
However, defining symmetric key based AKESSO is an area which is beyond the
scope of this paper.
Remark 4.2. Compared to Han et al.’s formal model given in [HMSY10], we require
key exchange in AKESSO, and each user does not need to hold a public/private key
pair. However, in Han et al.’s definition TCP (called IdP in their paper) is less
trusted as it will not be able to impersonate any user: Each user will run a zero
knowledge protocol to show that he/she knows the private key corresponding to the
public key embedded in his/her credential.
Before formally defining security properties, it is obvious that an AKESSO must
be correct. Credential Ci generated by trusted credential provider TCP will be
valid. User proof upi issued properly by user ui who holds a valid credential Ci ,
will be accepted by service provider Pj according to the U P V er algorithm, service
provider proof sppj issued properly by Pj will be accepted by user Ui according to
the SP P V er algorithm, and Ui and Pj will accept each other and output the same
Q
session key if they honestly run the key exchange protocol . Formally, we define
correctness as the following:
Definition 4.2. (Correctness) An AKESSO scheme is called correct if it satisfies
all the following conditions:
1. For any RIi and any key pair (P K, SK), if IDi ← IdGen(RIi ) and Ci ←
CGen(IDi , SK), then CV er(Ci , IDi , P K) = 1.
2. For any IDi , any key pair (P K, SK) and any M , if Ci ← CGen(IDi , SK)
and upi ← U P Gen(Ci , IDi , P K, M ), then U P V er(upi , IDi , P K, M ) = 1.
3. For any key pair (P Kj , SKj ) and any M 0 , if sppj ← SP P Gen(SKj , M 0 ), then
SP P V er(sppj , P Kj , M 0 ) = 1.
4. For any user Ui with valid credential Ci and service provider Pj with private
Q
key SKj , if both of them run the key exchange protocol
honestly, then they
will accept each other and output the same session key, i.e., Kij = Kji .
Informally, an AKESSO scheme is secure if all the desired functionalities given
in the above definition can be carried out only by the proper entities, i.e., not by
attackers who are allowed to access all possible resources in a rigorously specified
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adversary model. In fact, we shall define the security of SSO authentication which
corresponds to items 1) to 3), and session key privacy which corresponds to item
4).
To further define these security properties, we specify the adversary model as
Q
Q
follows: Let T CP be the trusted authority oracle with its key pair (SK, P K), iU,P
be the user oracle simulating a set of all registered users, interacting with the service
Q
provider oracle in session i, and jP,U be the service provider oracle simulating a
set of all registered service providers, interacting with the user oracle in session
j. Probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary A can ask the following oracle
queries.
Q
Q
1. O1 : Register( , U )— Upon receiving this query, T CP runs the IdGen(RIAi )
and CGen(IDAi , SK) algorithms, and outputs new user identity IDAi with
corresponding credential CAi to A who can verify the credential by running
CV er(·).
Q
2. O2 : Register( , P )— Upon receiving this query, the system will run Init(λ1 )
and output PAj ’s private/public key pair (SKAj , P KAj ) together with identity
SIDAj to A.
Q
Q
3. O3 : Execute(Ui , Pj )— Upon receiving this query, iU,P and jP,U will execute
Q
protocol as Ui and Pj in , respectively. The exchanged messages between
them will be recorded and sent to A. Here, we require that both Ui ’s credential
and Pj ’s private key are not been corrupted by A via O1 and O2 oracles.
4. O4 : Send(Ui , m, f )—This query sends the message m as message flow f ∈
Q
{0, 1, · · · , n} to the user oracle iU,P which simulates a user Ui , and then,
Q
the oracle computes message honestly in , and sends responses back to A,
Q
where n is the total number of messages transmitted in protocol . If a user
is the protocol initiator by default, A can also start a new session by asking
Send(Ui , ∅, 0), where ∅ denotes an empty set.
5. O5 : Send(Pj , m, f )—This query sends the message m as message flow f ∈
Q
{0, 1, · · · , n} to the user oracle iP,U which simulates a service provider Pj ,
Q
and then, the oracle computes message honestly in , and sends responses
back to A. If a service provider is the protocol initiator by default, A can also
start a new session by asking Send(Pj , ∅, 0).
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Q
6. O6 : Reveal( , i)—This query models the leakage of session key in session i.
This query only can be asked when a session key has been shared between a
service provider and a user in session i.
Remark 4.3. O3 simulates the real environment for passive attacker A who can
Q
eavesdrop all messages exchanged between Ui and Pj when executing protocol . If
A knows Ui ’s credential Ci and Pj ’s private key SKj , oracle O3 is not necessary as
Q
A can run protocol
by itself on their behalf. If A knows one of these two secrets
Q
but not both, A can run protocol
with Ui (Pj ) whose secret is not released by
executing oracle O4 (O5 ).
Remark 4.4. O4 simulates the real environment for active attacker A who may
obtain service provider Pj ’s private key SKj , send message m as message flow f ∈
{0, 1, · · · , n} to target user Ui and then get the corresponding response. To answer
this oracle, Ui will generate his/her response according to the specification of protocol
Q
and send it to A. Note that if Ui has not received all necessary previous messages
that match this message with message flow f , this oracle request will be rejected,
since it is meaningless to Ui . In fact, O4 also provides adversary A oracle access
Q
Q
on algorithm U P Gen(·) since iU,P will run U P Gen(·) somehow in executing .
In our construction, U P Gen(·) is the Schnorr signature generation algorithm. In
this case, on the one hand, oracle O4 may be no stronger than the signing oracle
in Game-UFCMA reviewed in section IV, since temporal message M , one input of
algorithm U P Gen(·), may be jointly decided by Ui and A (playing the role of Pj ),
rather than just by A. So, it may be hard for A to get Ui ’s user proof for any
arbitrary message M . On the other hand, adversary A may, in fact, not be weaker
than the forger in Game-UFCMA since besides O4 we also offer other oracle queries,
which may increase A’s attack capability.
To formally define soundness and credential privacy, it is necessary to discuss
the difference between them, since the majority of existing schemes only consider
credential privacy. Credential privacy requires unforgeability and unrecoverability.
The former guarantees that any PPT adversary A has only a negligible probability
for successfully forging valid credential Ct of target user Ut in the credential generation phase, while the latter requires that in the user authentication phase, any A
can only recover Ct with a negligible probability. Soundness is also critical in the
user authentication phase as it ensures that there is a negligible probability that any
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A without a valid credential can generate user proof up that passes through user
authentication. The existing studies [HMSY10, CL12] only focus on whether a valid
credential can be forged or recovered by attackers, but do not consider if a valid
credential is definitely necessary for generating a valid user proof. We shall define
these three properties as a single definition (but one for users and one for service
providers).
Let AO denotes adversary A who has access to all oracle queries in O = {Oi |i =
1, 2, · · · , 6} in the adversary model; let credential holder Ui with identity IDi and
credential Ci , and service provider Pj with identity SIDj and key pair (SKj , P Kj )
be two polynomial-time Turing machines. Let Ui and Pj interact with each other,
and place A between Ui and Pj .  denotes a negligible function. We define secure
credential-based user authentication as follows:
Definition 4.3. (Secure credential-based user authentication (SCUA)) An
AKESSO scheme achieves secure credential-based user authentication, if PPT adversary A has negligible advantage Adv SCU A (AO ) for creating a valid user proof without
4

holding the corresponding credential. Formally, for any PPT A, Adv SCU A (AO) =
Pr[(IDt , upt , M ) ← AO |U P V er(upt , IDt , P K, M ) = 1] ≤  with the following restrictions:
Q
• A has not obtained credential Ct corresponding to IDt via O1 - Register( , U )
oracle; and
• A has not obtained valid user proof up0t for message M by asking any oracle
in O, in particular O3 and O4 .
Similarly, the definition of secure service provider authentication is given below:
Definition 4.4. (Secure service provider authentication (SSPA)) An AKESSO
scheme achieves secure service provider authentication if PPT adversary A has negligible advantage Adv SSP A (AO ) for forging a valid service provider proof without
holding the corresponding service provider’s private key . Formally, for any PPT A,
4

Adv SSP A (AO ) = Pr[(P Kt , M 0 , sppt ) ← AO |SP P V er(P Kt , M 0 , sppt ) = 1] ≤  with
the following restrictions:
• A has not obtained the private key SKt corresponding to SIDt via O2 Q
Register( , P ) oracle;
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• A has not obtained valid service provider proof sppt for message M 0 by asking
any oracle in O, in particular O3 and O5 .
Q
Here, we review the freshness and test query T est( , i) for defining session key
security [BR93a]. An adversary can get session keys by asking O6 . We say the
session key is fresh if and only if the O6 query has not been asked w.r.t. this
session. In other words, the fresh session key must be unknown to the adversary.
For simplicity, we call the test query O7 , which is a game defined as follows:
Q
Q
Q
Q
• O7 — T est( , i): In protocol , if iU,P and iP,U accept and share the
same fresh session key in session i, upon receiving this query, by tossing coin
b the correct session key is returned if b = 0, otherwise, a random session
key is returned. A can only ask this query once and A needs to output one
bit b0 as the result of guessing b. A’s advantage in attacking the session key
Q
0
SKS
(AO )=|2 Pr[b0 = b] − 1|,
security (SKS) of protocol
is defined as AdvQ
where O0 = O ∪ {O7 }.
Session key security [BR93a] models adversary A’s inability to distinguish the
real session key and a random string, as formally defined below.
Definition 4.5. (Session Key Security) We say an AKESSO satisfies session
0

SKS
key security if for any PPT adversary A, AdvQ
(AO ) ≤ , where O0 = O ∪ {O7 }.

Finally, we can give the definition of a secure authenticated key exchange single
sign-on scheme.
Definition 4.6. (Secure Authenticated Key Exchange Single Sign-On Scheme)
An AKESSO scheme is called secure if it is correct and satisfies SCUA, SSPA, and
session key security.

4.3

Proposed Single Sign-On Scheme

This section presents a secure single sign-on scheme with user anonymity for
remote user authentication in distributed systems and networks. We use a Schnorr
signature [Sch89, Sch91] to overcome the drawbacks in the Chang-Lee scheme as
their user proof cannot provide soundness and credential privacy while the Schnorr
signature can. As a provably unforgeable signature scheme [PS00], Schnorr signature
allows a signer to authenticate him/herself by signing a message without releasing
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Ui
SIDj
IDi
Ci
x
y
Ek (M )
Dk (C)
h(·)
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The trusted credential provider
A service provider
A user
The unique identity of Pj
The unique identity of Ui
The credential of Ui
The long term private key of TCP
The public key of TCP
Symmetric encryption of message M using key k
Symmetric decryption of ciphertext C using key k
A secure hash function

Table 4.1: Notations in the Proposed SSO Scheme
any other useful information about his/her private signing key. In the proposed
scheme, the TCP first issues the credential for each user by signing the user’s identity IDi according to the Schnorr signature. Then, by treating his/her credential as
another public/private key pair the user can authenticate him/herself by signing a
Schnorr signature on a temporary message generated in the protocol. By contrast,
each service provider maintains its own public/private key pair in any secure signature scheme so that it can authenticate itself to users by simply issuing a normal
signature. Finally, as happens in the Chang-Lee scheme [CL12], the session key is
established by running a variant of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol, and
user anonymity is guaranteed by symmetric key encryption. The notations used in
the scheme are summarized in Table 4.1.
System Setup Phase: In this phase, TCP initializes his/her public and private
parameters as a Schnorr signature scheme. First, TCP picks large primes p and q
such that q|p − 1, chooses generator g of large safe prime order q in cyclic group G.
Then, TCP sets its private key SK = x, where x ∈ Z∗q is a random number, and
publishes its public key P K = y, where y = g x mod p.
Registration Phase: In this phase, the user asks TCP for registration, then
TCP issues unique identity IDi via IdGen(RIi ) and signs a Schnorr signature
(a, e, C) for user’s identity as credential generation algorithm CGen(IDi , SK). C
is kept secret by the user, while (a, e) will be made public. The details are given
below.
• User Registration: When user Ui asks for registration, TCP selects unique
identity IDi and generates credential Ci = (a, e, C) for Ui by selecting a randomness r ∈ Z∗q and computing a = g r mod p, e = h(a, IDi ), and C = r + xe
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mod q. Then, TCP sends identity IDi and credential Ci which is a Schnorr
signature for IDi to user Ui , where C should be kept secret.
• Service Provider Registration: Each Pj maintains a public/private key pair
(P Kj , SKj ) of any secure signature scheme. Here, algorithms SP P Gen(·)
and SP P V er(·) are identical to the signature generation and verification algorithms respectively.
Authentication Phase: In this phase, to authenticate him/herself user Ui
signs a Schnorr signature on the newly established session key Kij using credential
C the signing key, while Ui ’s session key material k2 is used as the commitment.
Note that the corresponding verification key of C is g C , which can be recovered by
computing g C = a · y e mod p. For service provider authentication, any provably
secure signature scheme can be used to authenticate a service provider in the proposed scheme. The session key is established by using the modified Diffie-Hellman
key exchange scheme which has been formally proved in [CL12], and user anonymity
and unlinkability are preserved by using symmetric key encryption to encrypt a, e,
and user’s identity IDi . The details of this phase are illustrated in Figure 4.1 and
further explained below.
1. User Ui chooses random nonce n1 and sends M1 = (Req, n1 ) to Pj , where Req
is a service request.
2. Upon receiving (Req, n1 ), Pj picks random number r1 ∈ Z∗q , computes its
session key material k1 = g r1 mod p, u = h(k1 ||SIDj ||n1 ) and signs u to get
signature v = SP P Gen(SKj , u), and sends M2 = (k1 , v, n2 ) to the user.
3. User Ui first computes u = h(k1 ||SIDj ||n1 ) and verifies the signature v by
checking if SP P V er(P Kj , u, v) = 1. If the output is “0”, Ui terminates the
protocol. Otherwise, Ui accepts service provider Pj ’s authentication, and then
selects random number r2 ∈ Z∗q to compute k2 = g r2 mod p, kij = k1r2 mod p,
and the session key Kij = h(SIDj ||kij ). After that, Ui signs Kij using his/her
credential secret C by calculating ei = h(k2 , Kij ), z = r2 + Cei mod q and
ω = EK (IDi ||n3 ||n2 ||e||a), where n3 is a nonce chosen by Ui . Finally, Ui sends
M3 = (ω, z, k2 ) to service provider Pj .
4. To verify z, Pj first calculates kij = k2r1 mod p, derives session key Kij =
h(SIDj ||kij ) and decrypt ω with Kij to recover IDi ||n3 ||n2 ||e||a. Then, Pj
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Figure 4.1: Participant Identification Phase of the Proposed SSO Scheme
checks if e = h(a||IDi ). If this does not hold, Pj aborts the protocol. Otherwise, the service provider computes ei = h(k2 , Kij ) and verifies z by checking
if g z = k2 · aei · (y e )ei mod p. If this holds, Pj accepts Ui ’s authentication,
believes that they have shared the same session key Kij , and sends V = h(n3 )
as M4 to Ui .
5. User Ui computes V 0 = h(n3 ) and checks if V 0 = V . If this holds, Ui believes
that he/she has shared the same session key Kij with Pj .
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Security Analysis

The proposed scheme employs the Schnorr signature scheme [Sch89, Sch91] to
generate credentials for users, uses a modified Diffie-Hellman key exchange scheme
to establish the session key, signs a Schnorr signature on the hashed session key for
user authentication, uses any secure signature scheme for server authentication, and
uses symmetric key encryption to ensure user anonymity. The secure authenticated
key exchange single sign-on (AKESSO) scheme requires secure credential-based user
authentication (SCUA), secure service provider authentication (SSPA), and a secure
session key. To prove the security of the proposed AKESSO, it will only be necessary
to prove SCUA and SSPA because (1) the proposed scheme only improves parts
of key generation, user authentication and service provider authentication in the
Chang-Lee scheme [CL12], while user anonymity and session key establishment have
not been modified; and user anonymity and session key security have been proved
in [CL12] and discussed in [WYX12] without revealing any problems. The following
is a formal analysis of the security of the proposed AKESSO scheme.
Theorem 4.1. (Correctness) The proposed construction is a correct AKESSO scheme
according to Definition 2.
Proof. This can be verified according to Definition 2 given in Section II.
Informally, the proposed AKESSO scheme guarantees SSPA as each service
provider employs a secure signature scheme. To prove SCUA, we need to show
that Definition 4.3 holds for the proposed AKESSO scheme by assuming the unforgeability of the Schnorr signature scheme.
Theorem 4.2. (Secure Credential-based User Authentication) In the proposed AKESSO
scheme, if there is PPT adversary A who has non-negligible advantage Adv SCU A (AO )
as specified in Definition 3, then the Schnorr signature scheme is existentially forgeable under UFCMA attacks as defined in Section IV.
Proof. As adversary A, with access to all oracles in O = {O1 , · · · , O6 }, has nonnegligible advantage Adv SCU A (AO ), according to Definition 3 this implies that at
least one of the following two cases is true:
• Case (1): With non-negligible probability 1 , AO is able to derive credential
Ct corresponding to unregistered target identity IDt .
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• Case (2): With non-negligible probability 2 , AO is able to forge a valid user
proof for new message M w.r.t. a registered target identity IDi .
If either Case (1) or Case (2) is true, we can construct an algorithm B that is
able to break the unforgeability of the Schnorr signature, where B runs AO as a
sub-program for fulfilling its purpose.
Case (1). Suppose that B is given a target Schnorr signature scheme with parameter (p, q, h(·)) and public key y = g x mod p, where the private key x is not
known to B. B’s strategy for wining Game-UFCMA with non-negligible probability
is to set up an AKESSO scheme for A and to simulate oracles in O so that A cannot
distinguish the difference between this simulated environment and a real AKESSO
scheme. Therefore, A will be able to successfully derive credential Ct for unregistered identity IDt with probability 1 . After that, B can adapt this credential into
a forged Schnorr signature for a new message and thus break the unforgeability of
the Schnorr signature scheme.
How does B sets up such a simulated AKESSO scheme for A. First, B sets y as
the public key of TCP and gives y to B. Then, each oracle in Oi (i = 1, · · · , 6) can
be simulated as follows. To simulate an O1 query, B can ask its own signing oracle
to get Schnorr signature Ci for each identity IDi and then reply (IDi , Ci ) to A.
To simulate an O2 query, B can simply run Init(λ1 ) to get public/private key pair
(SKj , P Kj ) for an identity SIDj , and then forward (SIDj , SKj , P Kj ) to A. As B
knows all users’ credentials and all service providers’ private keys, it can simulate
Q
oracles O3 , O4 , O5 and O6 by executing the whole protocol , running one move
on behalf of a user, running one move on behalf of a service provider, and revealing
a session, respectively. Note that as IDt is an unregistered identity in this case, the
corresponding user Ut will not be involved in any oracle Oi (i = 1, · · · , 6).
It is not difficult to see that the above simulated system is indistinguishable from
a real system from A’s point of view. Hence, A will be able to output credential Ct
for target identity IDt with non-negligible probability 1 , where IDt is not asked
in O1 queries. Therefore, B will simply forward Ct as a forged Schnorr signature
for message IDt . Since IDt is not asked in O1 queries, A does not ask IDt in its
signing oracle, i.e., IDt is a new message for B. So, B’s forged message-signature
pair (IDt , Ct ) is valid according to the definition of Game-UFCMA (refer to Section
IV). Moreover, B’s success rate is exactly the same as A’s, i.e., 1 , which is nonnegligible. Consequently, this means that B successfully breaks the unforgeability
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of the Schnorr signature scheme.
Case (2). This can be proved in a similar way to Case (1) but B will embed its
target Schnorr signature scheme in the user proof generation algorithm for registered
target user Ut with identity IDt . Details are given as follows.
Suppose that B is given a target Schnorr signature scheme with parameter
0

(p, q, h(·)) and public key y 0 = g x mod p, where private key x0 is not known to
B. First, B sets y = g x mod p as the public key of TCP by selecting random
number x as TCP’s private key. For any identity IDi except target identity IDt ,
to answer an O1 query B can directly issue credential Ci for IDi by generating a
Schnorr signature for IDi as B knows TCP’s private key x. In contrast, B will take
(a0 , e0 , x0 ) as the credential Ct for target identity IDt , where e0 ∈ {0, 1, · · · , q − 1}
0

is a random number, a0 ∈ Z∗p is set as a0 = y 0 · y −e mod p, and h(a0 , IDt ) is set as
0

0

e0 . So, we have g x = a0 y h(e ,IDt ) mod p. Note that B does not know the value of x0
and it will be not required to reveal Ct to A because IDt is the target identity. In
addition, here we can artificially fix the hash value for such a special input (a0 , IDt )
because the Schnorr signature is secure in random oracle where hash function can
be viewed as random function [PS00]. All other oracles in O can be simulated as in
Case (1), except A asks O3 and O4 queries in which Ut with identity IDt is involved.
In such scenarios, B can simulate Ut to output valid user proof upt w.r.t. credential
Q
Ct by executing the whole protocol or running one move with necessary help from
its own signing oracle w.r.t. public key y 0 .
Again, it is not difficult to see that the above simulated system is indistinguishable from a real system from A’s point of view. Hence, with probability 2 A will
be able to output valid user proof upt for message M w.r.t. target identity IDt ,
where M is not asked in O3 and O4 queries. Therefore, B can simply forward upt
as a forged Schnorr signature for message M . Since M is not asked in O3 and O4
queries, A does not ask M in its signing oracle, i.e., M is a new message for B.
So, B’s forged message-signature pair (upt , M ) is valid according to the definition of
Game-UFCMA (refer to Section IV). Moreover, B’s success rate is exactly the same
as A’s, i.e., 2 , which is non-negligible. Consequently, this means that B successfully
breaks the unforgeability of the Schnorr signature scheme.
Remark 4.5. In Case (1), AO could directly forge Ct , recover Ct after executing
Q
protocol
with user Ut or eavesdropping on the messages between Ut and some
service providers, or derive Ct in any other possible way, though AO is not allowed
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to obtain Ct by simply asking O1 oracle w.r.t. IDt . Hence, if our AKESSO fails
to satisfy the unforgeability or unrecoverability of the credential, then the Schnorr
signature is forgeable. Similarly, in Case (2) AO could directly forge user proof upt
without credential Ct , observe and adapt existing user proofs generated by Ut into
user proof upt for message M , or compute upt in any other way, though AO is
not allowed to obtain any user proof for the same message M by simply asking O3
and O4 oracles w.r.t. IDt . Hence, if our AKESSO fails to satisfy soundness of
credential-based authentication [WYX12], then the Schnorr signature is forgeable.
As the Schnorr signature scheme is proved to be secure under the discrete logarithm assumption [PS00], Theorem 4.2 assures that the proposed AKESSO scheme
achieves secure credential-based user authentication under the discrete logarithm assumption.
Theorem 4.3. (Secure Service Provider Authentication) In the proposed AKESSO,
if there is PPT adversary A who has non-negligible advantage Adv SSP A (AO ) as
specified in Definition 4, then the signature scheme employed by service providers is
existentially forgeable under UFCMA attacks as defined in Section IV.
Proof. Since a service provider proof is directly generated as a normal signature by
the corresponding service provider, Theorem 4.3 can be formally proved as we did
for Case (2) in Theorem 1. Note that here we do not need to discuss Case (1) as in
Theorem 1, because each service provider is required to register its public/private
key pair.
Theorem 4.4. According to Definition 6, the proposed AKESSO scheme is secure
under the assumption that all digital signatures employed in the scheme are existentially unforgeable against UFCMA attacks as specified in Section IV.
Proof. By Theorem 1, Theorem 2, Theorem 3 and session key security proved in
[CL12], Theorem 4 holds according to Definition 6.

4.5

Conclusion

Most existing single sign-on schemes have a number of security problems and
are vulnerable to carious types of attacks. In this chapter, we first formalized an
authenticated key exchange single sign-on scheme. In particular, we formally defined secure authentication for both users and service providers because this had
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not been done before [WYX12]. Then, a Schnorr mechanism based SSO scheme
was proposed to overcome the drawbacks of the Chang-Lee scheme [CL12] while
preserving its advantages. In this new scheme, to preserve credential generation
privacy, the TCP signs a Schnorr signature [Sch89, Sch91] on user’s identity; and
to protect credential privacy and soundness, the user exploits his/her credential as
a signing key to sign a Schnorr signature on the hashed session key. In fact, the
Schnorr signature mechanism [Sch89, Sch91] is more efficient than the RSA mechanism which was employed by the Chang-Lee scheme. Thus, the proposed scheme
reduces the computation cost, enhances confidentiality, while preserving soundness
and credential privacy.

Chapter 5
A Generic Framework of Three-Factor
Authentication

5.1

Introduction

Two factor authentication schemes were introduced in the previous two chapters.
For the user who has high security requirements, however, two factor authentication
schemes may be not secure enough. To resolve this problem, three factor authentication schemes have been introduced. Many existing three factor schemes, however,
have security problems and privacy issues. In order to address this problem, Huang
et al. [HXC+ 11] proposed a generic framework for three factor authentication. This
framework upgrades two factor authentication scheme to three factor authentication
scheme without any additional requirement. It also preserves the privacy of user’s
biometric characteristics, while without the requirement of trusted devices. Huang
et al.’s framework employs the ‘fuzzy extractor’ [DRS04] to generate a biometric
key. The ‘fuzzy extractor’ uses Hamming distance, set difference and edit distance
to tolerate errors. These distance measurements, however, have not been widely
accepted by the majority of biometric applications [WQ10]. In addition, the process
of Huang et al.’s framework can be reduced from running underlying scheme twice
to running it once. Huang et al. also have not deeply analysed the practicalness
and they have not provided a proper concrete scheme since that they put the above
work in the future.
This chapter proposes an improved generic framework of three factor authentication which based on [HXC+ 11]. This improved framework is more efficient and
practical while remains all advantages of [HXC+ 11]. According to the improved
framework, a provably secure concrete instantiation is provided along with its implementation analysis and privacy discussion. In particular, we propose a security
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model for three-factor-based authentication schemes which support session key establishment. A formal proof of our concrete instantiation is also provided according
to this security model.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 reviews and discusses
the two well known biometric identification mechanisms. After that, Section 5.3
reviews Huang et al.’s framework and then provides an improved generic framework for three-factor authentication. The concrete instantiation with analysis and
comparison are given in Section 5.4, in which, formal security proof and privacy
discussion of this instantiation are also provided. Finally, Section 5.5 concludes this
chapter.

5.2

Biometric Identification Mechanisms

In 1999, Juels and Wattenberg [JW99] proposed the first biometric identification
scheme, fuzzy commitment, using Hamming distance to tolerate errors. Later, in
2002, Juels and Sudan [JS02] introduced a provably secure ‘fuzzy vault’ scheme, in
which, a user chooses a long-bit secret key (treated as a biometric key) in advance,
and hides it using the user’s biometric template. In the ‘fuzzy vault’, however, the
Euclidean distance measurement is used to tolerate errors. In 2004, Dodis et al.
[DRS04] proposed a provably secure ‘fuzzy extractor’ which generates a random
pair strings R as a biometric key and a corresponding auxiliary string P directly
from the user’s biometric template. The ‘fuzzy extractor’ uses Hamming distance,
set difference and edit distance to tolerate errors. The ‘fuzzy vault’ has been widely
accepted since the Euclidean distance measurement is suitable for the majority of
biometric applications [WQ10], while the distance measurements used in the ‘fuzzy
extractor’ are not. This is also the reason why we choose the ‘fuzzy vault’ for biometric key generation. In 2008, Teoh and Ong [AT08] proposed a randomised dynamic
quantisation transformation (RDQT), which is based on fuzzy commitment, to binarize biometric data, satisfying randomness and uniqueness. Meanwhile, Sheng
et.al [SHFD08] presented a template-free biometric-key generation, which also can
generate a key directly from a biometric template. This section reviews the ‘fuzzy
extractor’ which has been employed by Huang et al.’s framework [HXC+ 11], and the
‘fuzzy vault’ scheme which is employed in our proposed framework.
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Fuzzy Extractor

The ‘fuzzy extractor’ has two procedures, a generation procedure (Gen) and a
reproduction procedure (Rep). After a user scans his biometric features, the Gen
extracts uniquely random R and corresponding auxiliary P from user’s biometric
template w. In the authentication phase, the inputs of Rep are P and unidentified
biometric template w0 ; the output of Rep is the corresponding R iff the difference
between w and w0 is within an acceptable error tolerance. The error tolerance in the
scheme depends on three error correcting techniques, namely Hamming distance, set
difference and edit distance. The definition of the ‘fuzzy extractor’ was introduced
by Dodis et al. [DRS04, DORS08]. To formally review this concept, we introduce
the following notations.
• t: the fuzzyness of the ‘fuzzy extractor’;
• A, B: two probability distributions;
• M : a metric space on N points with distance function dis(·);
• m: the min-entropy of A given B, which can be calculated by computing the
logarithm of average probability of value A given B;
• Ul : the uniform distribution on l-bit binary strings;
• SD(A, B): the statistical distance between A and B such that SD(A, B) =
1P
| Pr(A = v) − Pr(B = v)|;
2 v
Definition 5.1. An (M, m, l, t, ) − f uzzy extractor is a pair of randomised procedures Gen and Rep, respectively, with the following properties:
1. Gen is a probabilistic generation procedure with input w ∈ M , which outputs
public helper P ∈ {0, 1}∗ and an ‘extracted’ random string R ∈ {0, 1}l . For
any distribution W on M of min-entropy m, if < R, P >← Gen(W ), then it
requires that SD(< R, P >, < Ul , P >) ≤ .
2. Reproduction procedure Rep, can recover R, if and only if P and w0 are
provided as inputs, where w0 ∈ M , satisfies dis(w, w0 ) ≤ t.
< R, P >← Gen(W ), then Rep(w0 , P ) = R

Namely, if
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The ‘fuzzy extractor’ provides a good insight into biometric identification since
it extracts a unique random ‘private’ key directly from the user’s biometric features. However, as a theoretical biometric key generation scheme for public key
cryptosystem, the ‘fuzzy extractor’ has not been widely implemented since the distance measures in it are less accepted than the Euclidean distance measurement in
biometric applications [WQ10].

5.2.2

Fuzzy Vault

In 2002, Juels and Sudan [JS02] proposed a cryptographic construction for data
protection and user authentication by using fingerprints and smart cards, called the
‘fuzzy vault’. The errors in the ‘fuzzy vault’ have been tolerated by the Euclidean
distance measurement which has been widely accepted by the majority of biometric
applications. The operations of the ‘fuzzy vault’ are described as follows.
First, a user’s biometric features are scanned and his/her biometric template X
is extracted. Then, s/he selects and uses a polynomial P ol to encrypt secret string
K (treated as the biometric key) which has been chosen by the user in advance.
The user evaluates P ol on all elements in X and chooses a large number of random
chaff points which do not lie on P ol as the noise. The final vault V is the collection
of the genuine minutiae points which lie on P ol and the chaff points which do not
lie on P ol.
To recover secret string K from vault V , the user needs to offer his/her biometric
template X 0 , if the difference between X and X 0 is |X − X 0 | < , where X − X 0 =
{x|x ∈ X, x ∈
/ X 0 }, then polynomial P ol can be reconstructed because a sufficient
number of points on P ol can be identified and an error correcting scheme is used.
Thus, K can be successfully recovered once P ol is available.
In 2003, Clancy et. al [Cla03] proposed a secure smart card-based fingerprint
authentication scheme by using Juels and Sudan’s ‘fuzzy vault’. Later, in 2007, Nandakumar et. al [NJP07] proposed a fully automatic implementation by employing
the ‘fuzzy vault’, and using helper data to align unidentified fingerprints accurately.
The improved scheme used both location (x, y) and orientation attribute θ of a minutia point to record the biometric data, where (x, y) is the row and column indicates
in the image as the location, and θ is the orientation on the X-axis. The helper
data is high curvature points extracted from the fingerprint orientation field, thus it
neither affects the security nor leaks any information about the biometric template.
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One year later, Nagar, Nandakumar and Jain [NNJ08] improved the security and
matching accuracy of Nandakumar et. al’s fingerprint-based ‘fuzzy vault’ scheme
by employing additional minutiae descriptors [Fen08], which capture local ridge
orientation and ridge frequency information in the neighbourhood of a minutia. The
results in [NNJ08] showed that the improved scheme reduces the false acceptance
rate (FAR) and significantly increases the vault security. The operation of fingerprint
based ‘fuzzy vault’ follows:
Let a locking/unlocking pair (Lock, U nlock) is complete -fuzziness if the following holds. For every secret string k and every pair of biometric template sets (X,
X 0 ), such that |X − X 0 | ≤  for integer , then U nlock(X 0 , Lock(X, k)) = k with
overwhelming probability.
Vault Encoding (Lock):
X

1. −−−→ PX (K) → L
K,P ol

Procedure PX (K) denotes that the ‘fuzzy vault’ encrypts user’s secret K in
polynomial P ol, and evaluates P ol on all elements in the user’s biometric
sample X, which is represented as an unordered set. The output of PX (K) is
Locking set L;
CP

2. −
−→ Gen → V
L
The user selects chaff points CP which play the role of noise as the inputs of
Gen, where chaff points CP do not lie on P ol, while L does. r denotes the
number of points which lie on P ol in V , and s denotes the number of points
which do not lie on P ol in V , where s >> r. The output of Gen is V such
that V = CP ∪ L.
Vault Decoding (Unlock):
X0H0

1. −−−→ Rec → P ol
V,H
For the user who requests to recover P ol, the ‘fuzzy vault’ first uses original
helper data H and the requester’s help data H 0 to adjust the orientation of
the fingerprint, and then runs procedure Rec to reconstruct P ol from input V
if the difference between X and the requester’s extracted biometric template
X 0 satisfies |X − X 0 | < , where X − X 0 = {x|x ∈ X, x ∈
/ X 0 };
P ol

2. −
−→ De(Pol) → K
The procedure De(P ol) denotes the recovering algorithm which outputs the
secret key K by giving the input polynomial P ol.
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Here, r is the number of genuine points which lie on P ol in V , and this depends
on the number of features which have been extracted from X. The security of
the ‘fuzzy vault’ is in proportion to the number of chaff points. The degree of
polynomial is presented as n. Parameter  denotes error tolerance. Helper data
H consists of the high curvature points and the ordinate value of vault V , and H
does not leak the information of the user’s biometric features [NJP07, NNJ08]. The
security of the ‘fuzzy vault’ is based on (a) the difficulty in distinguishing the set of
genuine minutiae points from a set of chaff points in vault V and (b) the difficulty
to reconstruct the polynomial P ol in vault V .

5.3

A Generic Three-factor Authentication Framework

This section first reviews Huang et al.’s scheme, and then provides a more efficient
and practical framework.

5.3.1

Review of Huang et al.’s Framework

Huang et al.’s framework employs the ‘fuzzy extractor’ to generate a uniquely
long-bit random string as the biometric key of the user. By running the underlying
two-factor scheme twice, a three-factor scheme is constructed. Specifically, the first
running uses password and smart card as normal. Then, in the second time, the user
replaces the password by a biometric key and runs the underlying protocol again,
thus achieving a three-factor authentication. Huang et al.’s framework consists of
three phases:
Registration:
The processes of registration includes the following steps:
1. User Ui chooses initial password P W1 ;
2. Upon Ui scanning his/her biometric features, biometric template X is extracted, and then a pair (R, P ) is outputted by running Gen(X);
3. Let second password P W2 = h(R), where h(·) is a cryptographic hash function
chosen by Ui .
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2−F actor−Reg

4. Ui [P W1 ] ⇐=======⇒ S [SK1 ] → Data1 ;
By running the underlying two-factor registration protocol (2-Factor-Reg),
user Ui uses initial password P W1 and server S uses secret key SK1 to generate
Data1 ;
2−F actor−Reg

5. Ui [P W2 ] ⇐=======⇒ S [SK2 ] → Data2 .
Data2 is generated by running the 2-Factor-Reg again, in which Ui uses P W2
and S uses SK2 ;
6. Server stores Data1 and Data2 in SC and gives it to Ui ;
7. Ui updates SC by adding Data3 = (P, h(·), Rep(·)) in it, where P is the
auxiliary string for biometric key recovery, h(·) and Rep(·) are the descriptions
of the corresponding hash function algorithm and the reproduction procedure,
respectively.
The scheme supposes that P W1 , P W2 will be deleted immediately from the server
side upon completion of the corresponding steps because of the assumption that in
this phase, the server is fully trusted.
Authentication:
User Ui0 first inserts SC into the card reader and enters the password and scans
his/her biometric features. We use X 0 to denote the extracted biometric template.
The authentication phase is as follows.
1. The smart card computes R via Rep(·) and calculates P W2 = h(R). The
identical R can be reproduced if and only if the difference between X and X 0
satisfying dis(X, X 0 ) < t;
2−F actor−Auth

2. Ui0 [P W1 , SC(Data1 )]⇐========⇒ S [SK1 ];
User Ui0 with (P W1 , Data1 ) and S who with SK1 execute the authentication
phase (2-Factor-Auth) of the underlying two-factor authentication protocol;
2−F actor−Auth

3. Ui0 [P W2 , SC(Data2 ]⇐========⇒ S [SK2 ];
Ui0 and S run the 2-Factor-Auth again with P W2 , Data2 and SK2 , respectively.
The user successfully passes user authentication iff S is accepted in both step 2 and
step 3.
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Password Changing:
The password can be changed by running password changing protocol (2-FactorPassword-Changing) in the underlying two-factor scheme after successfully logging
and updating the SC accordingly. The biometrics can be changed by running step
2 and step 3 in the registration phase, then the user and server execute 2-FactorPassword-Changing and update the corresponding data in SC.

5.3.2

Improved Framework

Based on considerations of practicality, we use the ‘fuzzy vault’ to replace the
‘fuzzy extractor’ for biometric key generation, because the Euclidean distance measurement in the ‘fuzzy vault’ has been widely accepted by the majority of biometric
applications, while the distance measures in the ‘fuzzy extractor’ have not [WQ10].
Moreover, to enhance the efficiency and reduce the computational cost, our improved
framework reduces the process from running underlying two-factor authentication
scheme twice to running it once by combining the password and biometric key together and hashing it as the password of the underlying scheme. We assume that
the server in the registration phase is trusted. The details are specified as follows:
Three-Factor-Registration: The process of registration include the following
steps:
1. User Ui chooses initial password P W1 , long-bit secret key (treated as the
biometric key) P W2 , and computes P W =h(P W1 ||P W2 );
2. Upon Ui scanning his biometric features, the ‘fuzzy vault’ device extracts biometric template X with its helper data H from Ui ’s biometric features;
3. Taking X, P W2 , and polynomial P ol as inputs, PX (K) outputs locking set L,
and the device then runs Gen(CP, L)→V ;
2−f actor−Reg

4. Ui [P W ]⇐=======⇒ S [SK]→ Data1 , where P W =h(P W1 ||P W2 ).
The user with P W and the server with SK run the registration phase of the
underlying protocol.
5. Server stores Data1 in smart card SC, and gives it to Ui ;
6. Ui updates SC by adding Data2 to it, where Data2 = (V, H, Rec(·), De(·), h(·)).
Rec(·) and De(·) are the descriptions of the corresponding procedure in the
fuzzy vault, and h(·) is the description of a hash function.
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Three-Factor-Authentication:
To access services, user Ui0 inserts SC to a card reader, which can extracts the
data from the SC. Then, Ui0 inputs P W1 and scans his/her biometric features, the
extracted biometric template is X 0 and its helper data is H 0 . The details are as
follows:
1. The card reader extracts X 0 , H 0 from Ui0 ’s biometric features, and reproduces
P W2 by the following two steps:
Firstly, the ‘fuzzy vault’ device reproduces P ol via the Rec(·) procedure, if
and only if input X 0 satisfies |X − X 0 | < ;
Then, to reconstruct P W2 , taking P ol as the input of De(·), which outputs
P W2 .
2. The smart card calculates P W =h(P W1 ||P W2 );
2−f actor−Auth

3. Ui0 [P W, Data1 ]⇐========⇒ S [SK];
The user can successfully pass authentication if this step is success.
Three-Factor-Password-Changing:
The P W1 can be changed by following steps.
1. After passing authentication, Ui0 sends the password changing request, inputs
new password P W100 , and scans the biometric template.
2. The ‘fuzzy vault’ device will recover the P W2 by using the ‘fuzzy vault’ decoding scheme.
3. The smart card calculates P W 00 = h(P W100 ||P W2 ).
4. P W 00 is taken as the password and runs the password changing phase of the
underlying protocol.
Biometric key P W2 can be changed in a similar way. For this purpose, Ui0 chooses
a new biometric key as P W200 , then encrypts it via the ‘fuzzy vault’ device, outputs
V 00 and H 00 which replaces current V and H of Data2 in SC. The SC calculates
P W 00 = h(P W1 ||P W200 ), then takes P W 00 as the password and runs the password
changing phase of the underlying protocol. Ui0 can also decide to use another finger
to authenticate him. The process of finger changing is in a similar way.
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Concrete Instantiation

Concrete instantiation chooses Yang et al.’s provably secure two-factor authentication protocol [YWWD08] as the underlying scheme. Yang’s scheme employs the
Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol to establish the session key, and uses an asymmetric key encryption/decryption scheme to protect the transmitting messages. In
the registration phase, the server creates a credential with a long-term secret key by
using a pseudorandom function and sends it to the user who then does the exclusiveor operation (xor) on it along with his/her hashed password, and stores the outputs
in a smart card. Thus, only the server which has the long term secret key can
generate the credential and only the user who has the password and smart card
can recover the credential. To pass user authentication, the user need to recover
the credential and send it to the server after encrypting it by using a public key
encryption scheme. For server authentication, a secure signature scheme has been
employed. The notations used in the concrete instantiation are shown in Table 5.1.

IDi
SID
x
SK, P K
SK 0 , P K 0
P W1
P W2
SC
H
Ci
h
PX (K), Gen(), Rec(), De()
P RFx
sid
CT

User’s unique identity
Server’s unique identity
Server’s long term secret key
Server’s public key pair for encryption
Server’s key pair for signature scheme
User’s password.
User’s long-bit secret key
Smart Card
Helper data used in the ‘fuzzy vault’
Credential for Ui created by S
One way strong hash function. {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}l
Defined as in the ‘fuzzy vault’
{0, 1}k → {0, 1}k pseudorandom function
keyed by server’s long term secret key x.
Session identifier.
Cipher text.

Table 5.1: Notations in the Concrete Three-Factor Authentication
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Concrete Protocol

The basic idea of our concrete protocol is that using P W such that P W =
h(P W1 ||P W2 ) as the password in Yang’s scheme, where P W1 is the password known
by the user, P W2 is the biometric key which can be recovered by providing the smart
card and the corresponding biometric features. A user can pass authentication only
if s/he provides the correct password, smart card, and the biometric features. Thus,
a three-factor authentication scheme is achieved.
Registration
We assume the communication channel in this phase is secure.
1. User Ui obtains unique identity IDi from server S, and then chooses password
P W1 , polynomial P ol, and biometric key P W2 ;
2. The ‘fuzzy vault’ device extracts the biometric template and helper data
(X, H) from Ui ’s biometric features, and runs procedures PX (P W2 ) → L and
Gen(CP, L) to encrypt P W2 in V . Then, it calculates P W = h(P W1 ||P W2 ).
3. Server S generates credential Ci such that Ci = P RFx (h(IDi )), and hides it
with initial password P Winit such that B = Ci ⊕ P Winit .
4. S issues SC={IDi , SigData, AutData, EncData} to Ui . Here, SigData
is the description of the signature algorithm together with related parameters; AutData={B, V, H, h, Rec(), De()}; EncData is the description of an
encryption algorithm together with the parameters. h, Rec(), and De() are the
description of the hash function and the ‘fuzzy vault’ procedures, respectively.
5. Upon receiving SC, Ui updates B by computing B = Ci ⊕ P Winit ⊕ P W .
Login-and-Authentication Phase
User Ui0 inserts his/her smart-card in a card reader, inputs password P W10 and
scans his biometric features. The ‘fuzzy vault’ device extracts the biometric template
and helper data X 0 , H 0 , then the ‘fuzzy vault’ device calculates P ol = Rec(X 0 , H 0 , V, H),
and P W20 = DeP (P ol).

The smart card SC calculates Ci0 =B ⊕ P W 0 , where

P W 0 = h(P W10 ||P W20 ). Then, the protocol runs as follows:
1. Ui0 → S: M1 =(IDi , sid, g a )
User Ui0 sends identity IDi , session ID sid, and user’s session key material g a
to S, where a is a random number chosen by Ui ;

5.4. Concrete Instantiation

67

2. S → Ui0 : M2 =(SID, sid, g b , SigSK 0 (SID, IDi , sid, g a , g b ))
S sends his identity SID, session ID sid, and a signature with signing key
SK 0 to Ui0 ;
3. Ui0 → S: M3 =(IDi , sid, CT )
Ui checks the signature first. If it is not valid, Ui terminates the conversation. Otherwise, Ui computes M3 = (IDi , sid, CT ) and sends it to S, where
CT =EP K (Ci0 , IDi , SID, sid, g a , g b )) and EP K (M ) denotes the asymmetric key
encryption on message M under public key P K;
4. After decrypting CT by using SK, S checks Ci0 , and rejects Ui if Ci0 =P RFx (h(IDi ))
does not hold. Otherwise, S accepts Ui , and believes that they share the same
session key g ab .
Password-Changing
The change of password P W1 contains the following steps.
1. After successfully logging in, Ui chooses new password P W10 .
2. Ui calculates P Wnew = h(P W10 ||P W2 ) and Bnew = B ⊕ P W ⊕ P Wnew .
3. Replace B with Bnew in the smart card.
The biometric key P W2 and the biometric features can be changed in a similar
way, in which case, the vault V and help data H also need to be updated on smart
card.

5.4.2

Analysis of Implementation

We first analyse the capacity of the smart card. During the registration phase,
the point vi in set V are presented as three-tuple vi = (x, y, θ) (i = {1, 2, ..., r + s}),
where (x, y) is the row and column coordinates in the image as the location, and
θ is the orientation which respect to the X-axis. The number of points in vault V
depends on r and s, where r is the number of points which lie on P and s denotes
the number of points which do not lie on P (treated as chaff points or noise). Here,
s ≈ 10r. Nandakumar, Jain, and Pankanti [NJP07] showed that a 128-bit secret
key requires an 8-degree polynomial to encrypt the key, and the lengths of x, y, θ
are 6, 5, 5, respectively, in field F = GF (216 ). Table 5.2, taken from [NJP07], shows
the parameters in different databases:
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Parameter
Image size
r in V
s in V
Total points in V
n
Length of secret key k
Length of V
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FVC2002-DB2
560 × 296 at 569 dpi resolution
18-24
200-206
224
7-10
128-bit
448 Bytes

MSU-DBI
640 × 480 at 500 dpi resolution
24-36
300-312
336
10-12
128-bit
672 Bytes

Table 5.2: Parameters in Different Databases [NJP07]
The length of help data which depends on the points of maximum curvature in
the flow curves can be ignored. Thus, only a half KB of the ‘fuzzy vault’ parameters
needs to be stored in the smart card, and this is acceptable.
Now, we discuss the recognition rate of the ‘fuzzy vault’. [NNJ08, NJP07] employ
genuine acceptance rate (GAR) and false acceptance rate (FAR) to analyse the
recognition accuracy. The results show that both GAR and FAR are influenced by
n which is the degree of polynomial. The change of n affects both GAR and FAR; n
is in an inverse proportion to GAR and FAR. Fig. 5.1 are the results of both GAR
and FAR in the implementation provided in [NNJ08].

(a) Genuine Accept Rate (GAR)

(b) False Accept Rate (FAR)

Figure 5.1: GAR and FAR of the ‘Fuzzy Vault’ [NNJ08]
Generally, the FAR is 10−4 when n = 6, and it tends to zero when n is increase
to 8; all the results of GAR in the figure are practical even when n = 12, where
GAR> 70%. In fact, GAR may be also acceptable even it reduces to 30%, as this
means that a genuine user can pass authentication successfully by trying three or
four fingerprint identifications on average.
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The comparison between our concrete instantiation and other three factor authentication schemes is given in Table 5.3. It is obviously that [LH10, LNM+ 11,
Das11, KLY03] support free password changing, and [LH10, LNM+ 11, Das11] achieve
lower computational cost. However, all of them have security flaws. Both [BSSM+ 07]
and [FL09] are secure under the three-factor adversary model, but they do not
support freely password changing and [BSSM+ 07] does not support session key exchange. Our derived protocol protects user privacy, supports easy password changing and session key establishment, although its computation cost is not low but still
acceptable.

5.4.3

Formal Security Proof of Instantiation Protocol

The formal security proof of the factor-based authentication scheme has been
introduced as an open problem and a challenging issue from the point of view
of security analysis [HMZ+ 11], although some formal proofs have been provided
[XZF09, XZJ11, FL09, CK01, BR93a, BPR00]. In [HXC+ 11] (even in its supplementary file) Huang et al. only provided informally security discussion. In
[BR93a, BPR00, CK01], they provided generic models for formally proving the security of authenticated key exchange schemes, not for three-factor authentication
schemes. So, the three-factor-based mutual authentication scheme which supports
session key establishment has not been studied by these well-known models. This
section proposes a security model for three-factor-based authenticated key exchange
schemes. A formal proof of our proposed concrete scheme is also provided in our
security model.
The basic idea of our concrete protocol is that a server creates credential C for a
user via pseudorandom function P RF (·) with his/her long term secret key x, then
the user encrypts it by doing the exclusive operation along with combined password
and biometric key, which outputs encrypted credential B stored in the smart card.
The user recovers the credential iff s/he provides the correct password and biometric
features. For user authentication, the user encrypts and sends his/her identity
and credential C 0 to the server. Upon receiving it, server calculates credential C
with x according to user identity, and compares C and C 0 . If they have matched,
then the server accepts the user’s request. Otherwise, the server rejects it. Server
authentication has been preserved by a secure signature scheme. Assumptions for
security proofs are list below:
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Assumptions:
1. The ‘fuzzy vault’ scheme in

Q

is secure due to [NJP07, NNJ08].

2. Information stored in smart card SC can be extracted by an attacker if he/she
can obtain SC [Cla03].
3. No one has exactly the same biometric feature as others.
4. The case of a person without specific biometric features (such as a person
without fingerprints) is ignored here since it is such a rare circumstance.
We place probabilistic polynomial time (P P T ) adversary A, who can make
queries to any instance, between user Ui in user set U and sever Sj in server set
Q
S. Let sid
U,S denotes the user oracle, interacting with the server in session sid and
Qsid
S,U denotes the server oracle, interacting with user in the session sid. It is obviQ
Q
ous that if protocol
is secure when A knows two out of three factors, then
is
still secure when only one factor has been leaked to A. Therefore, we only consider
the case of two corrupted factors. The oracle queries which can be made by A are
defined as follows.
Adversary Model (AM ):
Q
1. Register( , Sj )—Upon receiving this query from A, server oracle acts as Sj
to run the registration phase with A, and issues identity IDi and sends smart
card SC to A.
2. Execute(Ui , Sj , sid)—This oracle query models all passive attackers who can
Q
eavesdrop on all messages transmitted between U and S in session sid in .
Q
Qsid
Upon receiving this query, sid
U,S and
S,U will execute protocol as Ui and Sj
Q
in , respectively. The messages exchanged between them will be recorded
and sent to A as responses.
3. Send(Ui , Sj , sid, Mm , m)—This query sends message Mm with sequence of
Q
message flow m to server oracle sid
S,U which simulates Sj , and then, the oracle
Q
will compute a respond honestly in , and send the response to A.
4. Send(Sj , Ui , sid, Mm0 , m0 )—This query sends message Mm0 with sequence of
Q
message flow m0 to user oracle sid
U,S which simulates Ui , and then, the user
Q
oracle will compute a respond honestly in , and send the response to A.
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Upon receiving the query with m0 = λ, where λ is an empty set, from A, the
user oracle will start a new session and send a service request message to A.
Q
5. Reveal( , Ui , Sj , sid)—This query models the leakage of a session key in session sid between user Ui and server Sj . This query only can be made when
a session key has been shared between the server and the user in session sid.
Upon receiving this query, the user oracle will send the shared session key to
A.
6. There are three corrupt queries:
(a) Corrupt(Ui , pw, SC). Upon receiving this query, user oracle will send
back the user Ui ’s password and the data stored in the smart card to the
adversary;
(b) Corrupt(Ui , pw, Bio). Upon receiving this query, user oracle will send
back the user Ui ’s password and the biometric template to the adversary;
(c) Corrupt(Ui , SC, Bio). Upon receiving this query, user oracle will send
back the user Ui ’s biometric template and the data stored in the smart
card to the adversary;
In a concrete attack, A can only make one corrupt query in the target session.
7. T est(Ui , Sj , sid)— This query can be made by A only after a session key has
been shared between Ui and Sj in a fresh session sid. If so, then a coin b is
tossed, if it lands b = 0, then this test query oracle outputs the session key.
Otherwise, a fixed-length random string is returned. A needs to outputs b0 = 0
(or b0 = 1) as the result of distinguishing the session key and a random string.
A can only ask this query once.
The definitions of matching conversations, secure mutual authentication and
secure key exchange [BR93a] are reviewed as follows.
Definition 5.2. (Matching Conversations): Fix number of moves R = 2ρ − 1 and
Q
Q
R-move protocol . Run
in the presence of adversary A in the AM and consider
Qsid
Qsid
two oracles U,S and S,U that engage in conversations K and K 0 , respectively.
(τ, α, β) denotes that A is given response β back after asking α to an oracle at time
Q
τ . If α = τ , then it means that protocol
starts a new session. Let ∗ denotes the
Q
final decision of R-move protocol .
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1. We say that K 0 is a matching conversation to K if there exist τ0 ≺ τ1 ≺
... ≺ τR and α1 , β1 , ..., αρ , βρ such that K is prefixed by (τ0 , λ, α1 ), (τ2 , β1 , α2 ),
... , (τ2ρ−4 , βρ−2 , αρ−1 ), (τ2ρ−2 , βρ−1 , αρ ) and K 0 is prefixed by (τ1 , α1 , β1 ),
(τ3 , α2 , β2 ), ..., (τ2ρ−3 , αρ−1 , βρ−1 ).
2. We say that K is a matching conversation to K 0 if there exist τ0 ≺ τ1 ≺ ... ≺ τR
and α1 , β1 , ..., αρ , βρ such that K 0 is prefixed by (τ1 , α1 , β1 ), (τ3 , α2 , β2 ), ...,
(τ2ρ−3 , αρ−1 , βρ−1 ), (τ2ρ−1 , αρ , ∗) and K is prefixed by (τ0 , λ, α1 ), (τ2 , β1 , α2 )
,..., (τ2ρ−4 , βρ−2 , αρ−1 ), (τ2ρ−2 , βρ−1 , αρ ).
Q
Qsid
Let sid
Ui ,Sj (or
Sj ,Ui ) denotes that the oracle who acts as user Ui (or server Sj )
communicates with server Sj (or user Ui ). Let N o − M atching A,Ui (k) (or N o −
Q
M atching A,Sj (k)) be the event that there exist Ui , Sj and sid such that sid
Ui ,Sj
Qsid
Qsid
Qsid
Qsid
Qsid
(or Sj ,Ui ) has accepted A as Sj ,Ui (or Ui ,Sj ), while Sj ,Ui (or Ui ,Sj ) has not
engaged in a matching conversation. In other words, it is the event that user Ui (or
server Sj ) believes that server Sj (or user Ui ) is communicating with him, but in
fact, it is adversary A who impersonates server Sj (or user Ui ).
Remark 5.1. The above definition is defined for the case of R = 2ρ − 1 moves
protocol. For the case of R = 2ρ moves protocol, the definition can be changed
trivially. So, we are not going to discuss it here.
Definition 5.3. (Secure Three-Factor Mutual Authentication (ST M A)) We say
Q
that
is a secure mutual authentication protocol if for any PPT adversary A in the
AM , the following properties are satisfied.
Qi
Q
1. If oracles sid
Sj ,Ui have matched conversations, then they accept each
Ui ,Sj and
other.
2.

Qsid

Ui ,Sj

accepted implies a matching conversation: the probability of N o −

M atching A,Ui (k) is negligible, where Sj should not be registered by A. (Secure server authentication)
3.

Qsid

Sj ,Ui

accepted implies a matching conversation: the probability of N o −

M atching A,Sj (k) is negligible, where Ui should not be registered by A. (Secure user authentication)
Definition 5.4. (Secure Three-Factor Authenticated Key Exchange (ST AKE)) A
Q
Protocol
is called ST AKE if the following properties hold for any adversary A
in the AM :
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is a ST M A protocol;

• if the session is fresh in protocol

Q

, and both

Qsid

Ui ,Sj

and

Qi

complete

Sj ,Ui

matching conversations, then they have shared the same session key;
• the advantage Adv A (k) is negligible.
Note that:
1. Session freshness requires satisfying follow probabilities:
•

Qsid

Ui ,Sj

and/or

Qsid

Sj ,Ui

accepted;

• no queries to reveal the session key have been made to

Qsid

Ui ,Sj

or

Qsid

Sj ,Ui ;

1
2. Adv A (k)=|Good − guessA (k)] − |, where the Good-guess is the event such
2
that A wins the game of AKE [BR93a];
To prove the security of our concrete scheme, we show that if A can successfully
pass user or server authentication with a non-negligible probability, then we can
construct a PPT Turing machine T to solve the hard problems by employing A with
a non-negligible probability. The concrete protocol is reviewed as follows:
1. Ui → S: M1 =(IDi , sid, g a )
2. S → Ui : M2 =(SID, sid, g b , SigSK 0 (SID, IDi , sid, g a , g b ))
3. Ui → S: M3 =(IDi , sid, CT ), where CT =EP K (Ci0 , IDi , SID, sid, g a , g b )
4. S checks credential Ci0 . Ui will pass user authentication if and only if Ci0 =P RFx
(h(IDi )).
Now, the shared session key is g ab .
Lemma 5.1. (Secure User Authentication) In the proposed protocol

Q

, if the pseu-

dorandom function (P RF ) is replaced by an ideal random function, the public key
Q
encryption (P KE) scheme is secure against CCA2 attack, and sid
Sj ,Ui has accepted,
then for any PPT adversary A in the AM , the probability of N o − M atching A,Sj (k)
is negligible.
Proof. This can be proved by contradiction. If there exists an adversary A who can
pass user authentication with non-negligible probability , then we can construct a
P P T Turing machine T without known secret key x to solve a hard problem, i.e.
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winning the game of P RF (Game-PRF), with a non-negligible probability by using
A.
In the Game-PRF, a challenger sends two different plaintexts P0 and P1 to the
P RF test query, then the P RF test query will answer with result P RFx (Pb ) to the
challenger, where b is the result of coin tossing. After that, the challenger needs to
output b0 = 0 or b0 = 1 as its guess to value b. Let Pradv [P RF ] be the advantage
1
of guessing, which is defined as Pradv [P RF ] = Prwin − , where Prwin denotes the
2
correct guessing rate. In this game, we give the challenger a power to ask the output
of P RF by providing a message Mpt . Upon receiving this request, the P RF oracle
Q
P RF will output a response P RFx (Mpt ) by using server’s secret key x. Here we
require that the asked message Mpt can not be sent as one of input to the P RF test
query.
The basic idea is that to win Game-PRF, T simulates an environment of our concrete protocol to convince adversary A that this simulation is the real environment
of concrete protocol execution. On the other side, A should only has a negligible
probability to know the truth, i.e. this is not a real protocol environment but a
simulation. In such a simulation, T communicates with A who has the ability to
break our concrete protocol in some way in a session with session ID sid with a
non-negligible probability. Then, in order to win Game-PRF, T will make use of
A’s ability to make the decision of which input message has been used to generate
the output P RFx (Pb ) with a non-negligible probability.
The simulation is constructed as follows. In the simulation, T answers all oracle
queries made by A. To achieve this goal, T needs to setup (SK, P K) for the public
key scheme and (SK 0 , P K 0 ) for the signature scheme, while T does not know the
Q
Q
value of long term secret key x which is for P RF . sid
Ui ,Sj denotes the user oracle
who has password P W1 , smart-card SC, and corresponding biometric template X
Q
which can recover biometric key P W2 with the SC. sid
Sj ,Ui denotes the server oracle
Q
who has P RF oracle P RF . In our concrete protocol, A can make the following
queries:
Q
• Register( , Sj )—Upon receiving this query from A, T runs the registration
Q
phase with A with the help of P RF . In particular, T needs to record all
identities which have been registered into what we called compromised table.
• Execute(Ui , Sj , sid)— In

Q Qsid
Q
, Ui ,Sj and sid
Sj ,Ui generate and record all mes-

sages transmitted between Ui and Sj in session sid, then send these messages
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to A.
• Send(Ui , Sj , sid, Mm , m)— A can send M1 to T , then T responds to M2 by
using SK 0 to sign a signature as the protocol specified. Upon receiving M3
from A, T sends the result of user authentication according to M1 and M3 by
Q
using SK to decrypt the ciphertext and asking P RF in order to verify the
credential.
• Send(Sj , Ui , sid, Mm0 , m0 )—Upon receiving a new session query Send(Sj ,Ui ,sid,
Q
Mλ ,λ), T asks sid
Ui ,Sj to send first message M1 to A. After receiving corresponding message M2 , T checks the signature by using P K 0 . If the signature
Q
is valid, T asks P RF and encrypts its output to form message M3 .
• Corrupt(Ui , f actora , f actorb )— Upon receiving this query,

Qsid

Ui ,Sj

will send the

corresponding two factors according to a and b, where a, b ∈ {pw, SC, Bio}
and a 6= b.
If A can pass user authentication successfully with a non-negligible probability
Q
without asking sid
Ui ,Sj , there must exist a matching conversation between A and T
who simulates server Sj if the following happens. First, A asks Corrupt(Ui ,f actora ,
f actorb ) to obtain two factors, then sends the first message to T who then responds
with the second message. Finally, A forms the third message to T .
Now, we show how T makes use of A to win Game-PRF with non-negligible
advantage as follows. We assume that A attacks at least once among qs sessions,
while T does not know which session A is going to attack. Now, T chooses a session
out of qs sessions randomly. Then, the probability of A passing user authentication
1
in this session is
· .
qs
To avoid the case that A found that this environment is only a simulation, in
the rest qs − 1 sessions, T redirects the identity IDr , which is included in the first
Q
message, to oracle P RF which will respond P RFx (IDr ) back to T . Then, T records
this identity into the compromised table and checks whether A has passed the user
authentication by matching P RFx (IDr ) with the credential which is encrypted in
the third message. If they are matched, then T responds to A that T accepts A’s
login request. Otherwise, T rejects A’s request. For these sessions, T just randomly
1
guesses the value of b, so the probability that T wins the game is .
2
To use A, after receiving first message M1 = (IDnew , sid, g a ), T forms M2 =
(SID, sid, g b , SigSK 0 (SID, IDnew , sid, g a , g b )) by using SK 0 and sends it to A. If A
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can successfully pass user authentication, s/he must be able to forge third message
0
, IDnew , SID, sid, g a , g b ). Now, T
M3 = (IDnew , sid, CT ), where CT = EP K (Cnew

requires to start the Game-PRF by choosing two distinct messages y0 = h(IDnew )
and y1 = R1 , and sends (y0 , y1 ) to the P RF test query. The query responds
0
and checks whether the reP RFx (yb ) to T , then T decrypts CT to recover Cnew
0
sponse is the same as Cnew
. If it is, then it outputs b0 = 0 as the guessed result of

b. Otherwise, it outputs b0 = 1.
We now analysis the probability of game winning. We assume that A forges user
Unew , and passes user authentication successfully in polynomial time τ , with nonQ
negligible probability , asking qR times Register( , Sj ), qE times Execute(Ui , Sj , sid),
qS times send query in qs sessions. The formula of calculating probability Pradv [P RF ]
of three different corrupting cases should be the same but with different  because we
do not care how A can pass the user authentication. If A does not select this special
1
session, the probability of game wining without the help of A is . Otherwise, if
2
A indeed attacks this special session chose by T , then the probability is concerned
as follows. The probability of A pass authentication is , so the probability that we
1
win the Game-PRF is ( · 1 + (1 − ) · ). Because if A has passed authentication,
2
then we have 100% probability to win the game. On the other side, A may also
1
failed with the probability of (1 − ), in this case, we have probability to win the
2
game. Thus,
1
1
qsq − 1 1 1
· ( · 1 + (1 − ) · ) + s
· −
qs
2
qs
2 2
 + qs 1
=
−
2qs
2

=
2qs

Pradv [P RF ] =

It is clear that Pradv [P RF ] is non-negligible since  is non-negligible, and T spends
τ 0 = τ + τ2 time to win games, where τ2 is the executing time of T interaction with
the test query. It is obvious that both τ and τ20 are polynomial times, thus, τ 0 is also
a polynomial time. Therefore, T can win Game-PRF with non-negligible advantage
Pradv [P RF ], and this contradicts assumption.
Lemma 5.2. (Secure Server Authentication) In proposed protocol

Q

, if the sigQ
nature scheme is unforgeable against adaptive chosen message attacks, and sid
Ui ,Sj
has accepted, then for any PPT adversary A in the AM , the probability of N o −
M atching A,Ui (k) is negligible.
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Proof. This can be proved by contradiction. If A has been accepted by

Qsid

Ui ,Sj

with

non-negligible probability of N o − M atching A,Ui (k), then we can construct a P P T
machine T which can win the Game-UFCMA [GMR88] by employing A.
Q
In Game-UFCMA, there is a signature signing oracle Sign . A challenger who
has got the P K 0 can make a signing query to a signature on any message Mi , and
can also verify the signature by using P K 0 . Finally, the challenger outputs new
message Mnew which the signing oracle has not been asked to sign together with a
forged signature. The challenger wins if the signature is valid for Mnew under P K 0 .
Let Prwin [SIG] denotes the probability advantage of game winning.
The basic idea is that to win Game-UFCMA, T simulates an environment of our
concrete protocol to convince adversary A that this simulation is the real concrete
protocol. On the other side, A should only has a negligible probability to know
the truce, i.e. this is not a real protocol environment but a simulation. In such
simulation, T communicates with A who has the ability to successfully forge server’s
signature in a session with session ID sid with a non-negligible probability. Then, T
will make use of A’s ability to win Game-UFCMA with a non-negligible probability.
To use A, T need to simulate A’s view as follows. In the simulation, T answers
all oracle queries made by A. To achieve this goal, T needs to setup all parameters
except signing key SK 0 . In our concrete scheme, A can ask following quires:
• Execute(Ui , Sj , sid)— In

Q Qsid
Q
, Ui ,Sj and sid
Sj ,Ui generate and record all mes-

sages transmitted between Ui and Sj , then send them to A.
• Send(Ui , Sj , sid, M, m)— A can send M1 to T , then T responds M2 by asking
Q
Q
the Sign of sid
Sj ,Ui . Upon receiving M3 from A, T sends the result of user
authentication according to M1 and M3 .
• Send(Sj , Ui , sid, Mm0 , m0 )—Upon receiving new session query Send(Sj , Mλ , λ),
Q
T asks sid
Ui ,Sj to send first message M1 to A. After receiving corresponding
M2 , T checks the signature, and forms M3 if the signature is valid.
If A can successfully pass server authentication with a non-negligible probability,
there must exist a matching conversation between A and T who simulates user Ui if
the following happens. In the simulation, first, T chooses message M1 = (T, sid, g a ),
and sends it to A. If A can successfully pass server authentication, then A will form
message M2 = (SID, sid, g b , SigSK 0 (SID, T, sid, g a , g b )) and send it to T .
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To win the Game-UFCMA with A’s help, T sends M = (SID, T, sid, g a , g b )
together with the signature in M2 to the test query. We assume that A forges server
S and passes server authentication successfully in polynomial time τ , with nonnegligible probability , asking qE times to Execute(Ui , Sj , sid) and qS times to send
a query, which contains qs times Send(Sj , Ui , sid, Mm0 , m0 ). Let η be the probability
of T winning Game-UFCMA when A has failed to pass server authentication. The
probability is concerned as follows. In qs times send query made by A, we choose
one query to help us to answer the Game-UFCMA. The probability of A pass sever
authentication is , so the probability of we win the Game-UFCMA is (·1+(1−)·η).
Because that if A has passed authentication, then we have 100% probability to win
the game. On the other side, A may also failed with the probability of (1 − ), in
this case, we have the probability of η to win the game. For the rest queries, the
probability of game wining without the help of A is η. Thus,
1
qs − 1
· ( · 1 + (1 − ) · η) +
·η
qs
qs
 + η · (qs − )
=
qs

Prwin [SIG] =

It is clear that Prwin [SIG] is non-negligible since  is non-negligible. The time
T spent to win the games is τ 0 = τ + τ3 , where t3 is the executing time of T spends
in GAME-UFCMA. τ 0 is a polynomial time because both τ and τ30 are polynomial
times. Therefore, we can construct PPT machine T to win Game-UFCMA of the
signature scheme, with non-negligible probability, and this is a contradiction.
Theorem 5.3. (Secure Three-Factor Mutual Authentication (ST M A)) In proposed
Q
protocol , if: (A) the P RF is replaced by an ideal random function and P KE
scheme is secure against CCA2 attack; (B) the signature scheme is unforgeable
Q
Qsid
against chosen message attack; (C) at least one of sid
Ui ,Sj and
Sj ,Ui has accepted;
then for any PPT adversary A in the AM , the probabilities of both N o−M atching AUi (k)
and N o − M atching ASj (k) are negligible.
Proof. Obviously, the first condition of Definition 5.3 holds because it is easy to
verify that our concrete protocol is correct. In addition, by Lemma 5.1 and Lemma
5.2, the second and third conditions of Definition 5.3 also hold. Therefore, Theorem
5.3 holds.
Theorem 5.4. (Secure Three-Factor Authenticated Key Exchange (ST AKE)) In
Q
proposed protocol , if (A) the P RF is replaced by an ideal random function and the
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P KE scheme is secure against CCA2 attack; (B) the signature scheme is unforgeable against chosen message attack; then for any PPT adversary A in the AM , the
advantage Adv A (k) of A winning the game of AKEP in a fresh session is negligible.
Proof. According to the Definition 5.4, ST AKE need to meet three conditions. The
Q
first condition is that protocol
is required to satisfies ST M A. This condition is
achieved because Theorem 5.3. The second condition is that for a fresh session in
Q
protocol , if complete conversations are matched, then the same session key must
be shared between these two communicating parties. This condition is achieved
because that in our concrete scheme, the key exchange is the plain two-move DiffieHellman protocol [CK01], and this condition is a well-known property and it was
proved. For the third condition, the advantage Adv A (k) = | Pr[Good − guessA (k)] −
Q
1
| is non-negligible due to [CK01]. Thus,
is a secure three-factor authenticated
2
key exchange protocol.

5.4.4

Privacy Discussion

The proposed framework provides strong protection of user privacy. First, the
server does not know any information about the user’s biometric template since the
user need not provide biometric features to the server. Second, the information in
SC is also unable to leak biometric information to others. In SC, only vault V and
helper data H are related to the biometric features, however, V has been added along
with a large number of chaff points as noise. Thus, the probability of successfully
recovering the biometric template is negligible due to [NJP07]. Moreover, helper
data H in the ‘fuzzy vault’ does not reveal the user’s biometric templates since they
are global features which do not leak any information of local characteristics[NJP07]
and two different finger templates can extract very similar helper data [NJP07].
A different P W2 has been chosen, then a new V has been generated. In another
words, the same biometric feature can encrypt different keys, and output different
vault V . Thus, a user can use the same biometric feature in different servers with
different biometric keys, and output different vault V .

5.5. Conclusion
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Conclusion

The proposed improved framework for three-factor authentication is efficient
and practical in distributed systems and networks. The framework upgrades twofactor authentication schemes to three-factor authentication schemes; the derived
scheme protects user’s privacy, and enhances security. In addition, a provably secure
concrete authentication scheme has been provided with formal security proof and
an analysis which shows the concrete scheme is more secure and practical.

Chapter 6
Conclusion
This chapter concludes the thesis in two parts: the summary of contributions
and the promotion of open problems.

6.1

Contributions

This thesis focuses primarily on two techniques for remote user authentication:
single sign-on and three-factor authentication. It aims: (a) to prevent attacks on
SSO mechanisms by analysing and formally defining SSO mechanisms; (b) to provide a provably secure SSO scheme based on the proposed formal model and (c) to
offer a generic framework of three-factor authentication with provably secure concrete instantiation for the user who has higher security requirements. The main
contributions of this thesis are as follows:
• Chapter 3 first provides some new insights into a recent single sign-on scheme
proposed by Chang and Lee [CL12]. Next, based on this analysis, Chapter
3 points out the shortcomings of the Chang-Lee scheme and identifies two
potential attacks with an analysis of their success probability. In particular,
these two impersonation attacks show that their scheme is actually insecure
as it fails to meet credential privacy and soundness of authentication. This
chapter also makes a carefully analysis on the issues of how to design single
sign-on scheme. Finally, the drawbacks of the Chang-Lee scheme are overcome
by employing the efficient verifiable encryption of RSA signatures (RSA-VES)
which was proposed for fair exchange by Ateniese[Ate99].
• In Chapter 4, we have formalised the security model of single sign-on with
authenticated key exchange. In particular, we have pointed out the difference between soundness and credential privacy. The proposed model presents
82
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a unified definition of formally specifying soundness and credential privacy
for authenticated key exchange single sign-on (AKESSO). According to the
formal model, this chapter proposes a provably secure single sign-on authentication scheme which satisfies soundness, preserves credential privacy, meets
user anonymity, supports session key exchange. Due to its high efficiency, the
scheme is suitable for mobile device users in distributed environments.
• Chapter 5 proposes an improved generic framework for three-factor authentication. This framework can upgrade a two factor authentication scheme
to a three factor authentication scheme. The derived three-factor scheme is
suitable for environments where the underlying two-factor scheme is specified.
Compare with Huang et al.’s scheme [HXC+ 11], the proposed generic framework enhances efficiency and it is more practical. A provably secure concrete
instantiation of the generic framework is also provided. In particular, we have
provided an performance analysis, a formal security proof and a privacy discussion of the concrete instantiation.

6.2

Open Problems

As mentioned in Chapter 3, the open problems are to formally define authentication soundness and construct efficient and provably secure single sign-on schemes.
Han et al.’s model [HMSY10] requires additional PKI for users but it does not require the third party to be fully trusted. Our formal model of SSO does not require
users holding publick key certificate, however, it may be not mature because it requires a fully trusted third party. So, another challenge is how to provide the same
security level while reducing the trust level of the third party, and without requiring
PKI for users. These challenges may be considered as a future work.
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Václav Matyás Jr. and Zdenek Rı́ha. Toward reliable user authentication through biometrics. IEEE Security & Privacy, 1(3):45–49, 2003.

[JS02]

Ari Juels and Madhu Sudan. A fuzzy vault scheme. In International
Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT), page 408. IEEE Press, 2002.

[JW99]

Ari Juels and Martin Wattenberg. A fuzzy commitment scheme. In
ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pages
28–36, 1999.

[JW09]

Wen-Shenq Juang and Jing-Lin Wu. Robust and efficient authenticated key agreement in mobile communications. Int. J. Mob. Commun.,
7(5):562–579, April 2009.

[KLY03]

Hyun-Sung Kim, Sung-Woon Lee, and Kee-Young Yoo.

Id-based

password authentication scheme using smart cards and fingerprints.
SIGOPS Oper. Syst. Rev., 37:32–41, October 2003.
[Lam81]

Leslie Lamport. Password authentication with insecure communication.
Commun. ACM, 24(11):770–772, Nov. 1981.

[LC00]

Wei-Bin Lee and Chin-Chen Chang. User identification and key distribution maintaining anonymity for distributed computer networks.
Computer Systems Science and Engineering, 15(4):113 –116, Aug. 2000.

[LH10]

Chun-Ta Li and Min-Shiang Hwang. An efficient biometrics-based remote user authentication scheme using smart cards. J. Netw. Comput.
Appl., 33(1):1–5, January 2010.

[LMM81]

Richard E. Lennon, Stephen M. Matyas, and Carl H. Meyer. Cryptographic authentication of time-invariant quantities. IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COMMUNICATIONS, 29(6):773–777, June 1981.

[LNM+ 11]

Xiong Li, Jian-Wei Niu, Jian Ma, Wen-Dong Wang, and Cheng-Lian
Liu. Cryptanalysis and improvement of a biometrics-based remote user
authentication scheme using smart cards. Journal of Network and Computer Applications, 34(1):73–79, 2011.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

[Mao04]

90

Wenbo Mao. Modern cryptography: theory and practice. HP Professional Series. Prentice Hall PTR, 2004.

[Mil82]

F. Miller. Telegraphic code to insure privacy and secrecy in the transmission of telegrams. C.M. Cornwell, 1882.

[MK06]

Kumar V. Mangipudi and Rajendra S. Katti. A secure identification
and key agreement protocol with user anonymity (sika). Computers &
Security, 25(6):420–425, 2006.

[NJP07]

Karthik Nandakumar,

Anil K. Jain,

and Sharath Pankanti.

Fingerprint-based fuzzy vault: Implementation and performance. IEEE
Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 2(4):744–757,
2007.
[NNJ08]

Abhishek Nagar, Karthik Nandakumar, and Anil K. Jain. Securing
fingerprint template: Fuzzy vault with minutiae descriptors. In 19th
International Conference on Pattern Recognition, 2008. ICPR 2008.,
pages 1 –4, dec. 2008.

[NSC+ 93]

B. Clifford Neuman, Stuart G. Stubblebine, B. Clifford, Neuman Stuart, and G. Stubblebine. A note on the use of timestamps as nonces.
Operating Systems Review, 27:10–14, 1993.

[OR87]

Dave Otway and Owen Rees. Efficient and timely mutual authentication. SIGOPS Oper. Syst. Rev., 21(1):8–10, January 1987.

[oS77]

National Bureau of Standards. Data Encryption Standard. FIPSPub.46., Department of Commerce, Washington D.C., U.S., January
1977.

[OT89]

Eiji Okamoto and Kazue Tanaka. Identity-based information security
management system for personal computer networks. IEEE Journal on
Selected Areas in Communications, 7(2):290 –294, feb 1989.

[PKC]

PKCS. Public key cryptography standards, PKCS #1 v2.1. RSA cryptography standard, draft 2, 2001.
rsalabs/pkcs/.

http://www.rsasecurity.com/

BIBLIOGRAPHY

[PS96]

91

David Pointcheval and Jacques Stern. Security proofs for signature
schemes. In EUROCRYPT, pages 387–398, 1996.

[PS00]

David Pointcheval and Jacques Stern. Security arguments for digital
signatures and blind signatures. Journal of Cryptology, 13(3):361–396,
2000.

[RSA78]

Ronald L. Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard M. Adleman. A method
for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems. Communnication of ACM, 21:120–126, 1978.

[Sch89]

Claus-Peter Schnorr. Efficient identification and signatures for smart
cards. In CRYPTO, pages 239–252, 1989.

[Sch91]

Claus-Peter Schnorr. Efficient signature generation by smart cards. J.
Cryptology, 4(3):161–174, 1991.

[Sco04]

Michael Scott. Cryptanalysis of an id-based password authentication
scheme using smart cards and fingerprints. SIGOPS Oper. Syst. Rev.,
38:73–75, April 2004.

[SHFD08]

Weiguo Sheng, Gareth Howells, Michael C. Fairhurst, and Farzin Deravi. Template-free biometric-key generation by means of fuzzy genetic
clustering. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security,
3(2):183–191, 2008.

[Sho02]

Victor Shoup. Oaep reconsidered. J. Cryptology, 15(4):223–249, 2002.

[SKS+ 92]

Kehne Schonwalder, A. Kehne, J. Schonwalder, H. Langendorfer, and
Tu Braunschweig. A nonce-based protocol for multiple authentications.
SIGOPS Oper. Syst. Rev., 26(4):84–89, October 1992.

[SLH03]

Jau-Ji Shena, Chih-Wei Linb, and Min-Shiang Hwang. Security enhancement for the timestamp-based password authentication scheme
using smart cards. Computers & Security, 22(7):591–595, 2003.

[SY96]

Shiuh-Pyng Shieh and Wen-Her Yang. An authentication and key distribution system for open network systems. SIGOPS Oper. Syst. Rev.,
30(2):32–41, April 1996.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

[Syv93]

92

Paul Syverson. On key distribution protocols for repeated authentication. Operating Systems Review, 27:24–30, 1993.

[Ten95]

Gerald Tenenbaum. Introduction to analytic and probabilistic number
theory. Cambridge studies in advanced mathematics, 46, 1995.

[UPJP04]

Umut Uludag, Sharath Pankanti, Anil K. Jain, and Salil Prabhakar.
Biometric cryptosystems: Issues and challenges. In Proceedings of the
IEEE, pages 948–960, 2004.

[WB06]

Guilin Wang and Feng Bao. Cryptanalysis of timestamp-based password authentication schemes using smart cards. In Proceedings of the
8th international conference on Information and Communications Security, ICICS’06, pages 399–409, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2006. SpringerVerlag.

[Wei]

Eric Weisstein. Relatively prime. mathworld-a wolfram web resource.
http://mathworld.wolfram.com/RelativelyPrime.html.

[WH04]

Tzong-Sun Wu and Chien-Lung Hsu.

Efficient user identification

scheme with key distribution preserving anonymity for distributed computer networks. Computers & Security, 23(2):120–125, 2004.
[Wik12a]

Wikipedia. Rc4 — wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, 2012. [Online;
accessed 23-May-2012].

[Wik12b]

Wikipedia. RSA (algorithm) — wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, 2012.
[Online; accessed 23-May-2012].

[WQ10]

Yongdong Wu and Bo Qiu. Transforming a pattern identifier into biometric key generators. In ICME, pages 78–82, 2010.

[WYX12]

Guilin Wang, Jiangshan Yu, and Qi Xie. Security analysis of a single
sign-on mechanism for distributed computer networks. IEEE Trans.
Industrial Informatics, accepted, July, 2012.

[XSK+ 05]

Yuefei Xu, R. Song, L. Korba, Lihui Wang, Weiming Shen, and S. Lang.
Distributed device networks with security constraints. IEEE Trans.
Industrial Informatics, 1(4):217–225, 2005.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

[XZF09]

93

Jing Xu, Wen-Tao Zhu, and Dengguo Feng. An improved smart card
based password authentication scheme with provable security. Computer Standards & Interfaces, 31(4):723–728, 2009.

[XZJ11]

Jing Xu, Wen-Tao Zhu, and Wenting Jin. A generic framework for
constructing cross-realm c2c-paka protocols based on the smart card.
Concurrency and Computation: Practice and Experience, 23(12):1386–
1398, 2011.

[YKY05]

Eun-Jun Yoon, Woo-Hun Kim, and Kee-Young Yoo. Security enhancement for password authentication schemes with smart cards. In Proceedings of the Second international conference on Trust, Privacy, and
Security in Digital Business, TrustBus’05, pages 311–320, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2005. Springer-Verlag.

[YS99]

Wen-Her Yang and Shiuh-Pyng Shieh.

Password authentication

schemes with smart cards. Computers & Security, 18(8):727–733, 1999.
[YWB+ 04] Yanjiang Yang, Shuhong Wang, Feng Bao, Jie Wang, and Robert H.
Deng. New efficient user identification and key distribution scheme
providing enhanced security. Computers & Security, 23(8):697–704,
2004.
[YWC05]

Chou-Chen Yanga, Ren-Chiun Wang, and Ting-Yi Chang. An improvement of the yang-shieh password authentication schemes. Applied
Mathematics and Computation, 162(3):1391–1396, 2005.

[YWWD08] Guomin Yang, Duncan S. Wong, Huaxiong Wang, and Xiaotie Deng.
Two-factor mutual authentication based on smart cards and passwords.
J. Comput. Syst. Sci., 74:1160–1172, November 2008.

